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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

**MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

## **THESIS**

**THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE:  
WHERE DO WE FIT?**

by

Kirk S. Marlowe

September 2009

Thesis Advisor:  
Second Reader:

Christopher Bellavita  
David Brannan

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**THE HOMELAND SECURITY ENTERPRISE: WHERE DO WE FIT?**

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Captain, Virginia State Police  
B.A.S., University of Richmond, 2003

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Homeland security is a responsibility to be shared across the nation. Resource demands, differing cultures, and varying motivations result in frustration and confusion that conflict with the nation's need to collaborate and cooperate. As such, the homeland security enterprise appears to be imploding from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, competitive funding, and mistrust, which cause stakeholders to wonder where they fit in this complex, interdependent environment.

This study examines reports, literature, and studies, along with interviews of homeland security executives from the four levels of government. It is argued and supported by the research that enhancing the nation's ability to collaborate involves a hybrid approach, where operational functions are decentralized and intelligence functions are centralized. The operational component encourages growth from the bottom of the enterprise through a decentralized block-grant process that allows jurisdictions to address their unique demands. The intelligence component recommends comprehensive reform and uses the nation's layered system of government as a portal to provide situational awareness at all levels.

Collectively, the study's recommendations create an environment ripe for collaboration, where leaders capitalize on the strengths of interconnectivity and continuously add value so that the synergy of combined efforts positively influences the homeland security enterprise.



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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Homeland security is a responsibility to be shared across the nation. Resource demands, differing cultures, and varying motivations result in frustration and confusion that conflict with the nation's need to collaborate and cooperate. As such, the homeland security enterprise appears to be imploding from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, competitive funding, and mistrust, which cause stakeholders to wonder where they fit in this complex interdependent environment.

While human emotion and interpersonal relationships are at the core of this complexity, it is hypothesized that environmental conditions exacerbate the frustration and confusion. In pursuit of a solution, this study examines reports, literature, and studies, along with interviews of homeland security executives from the four levels of government to identify gaps in the homeland security enterprise. Collectively, the research reflects gaps resulting from a lack of trust, fragmented communications, and inadequate funding mechanisms.

These gaps form the core chapters of this thesis, which are supported by research and reflect that determining where homeland security stakeholders, fit in the homeland security enterprise involves enhancing the nation's collaborative capacity. It is argued that building such capacity involves a hybrid approach, where operational functions are decentralized and intelligence functions are centralized. The decentralized operational component encourages growth from the bottom of the enterprise by consolidating Department of Homeland Security Grants with similar goals and objectives, and allocating this funding through a decentralized block grant that allows jurisdictions the autonomy to address their unique demands. Meeting local demands engages communities at the bottom of the enterprise and encourages the growth of small trustful relationships that serve as the foundation for enterprise-wide growth.



In contrast, the intelligence component involves comprehensive reform and uses the layered federalist system of government to delineate roles and provide portals for the free-flow of intelligence that promotes situational awareness at all levels. This more structured approach consolidates domestic intelligence responsibilities within the Federal Bureau of Investigation and reallocates intelligence personnel from other federal agencies, thereby capitalizing on existing human resources and minimizing expenses.

In its entirety, the study's recommendations create an environment ripe for collaboration, where leaders capitalize on the strengths of interconnectivity and continuously add value so that the synergy of the combined efforts positively influences the homeland security enterprise. According to Ryan and Shu, "It is up to a few good leaders in each organization to challenge the status quo. . . . if there is anything certain . . . it is its uncertainty" (2009, p. 41). Homeland security needs "A new brand of collaborative and innovative leadership" (Elkington, 2008, p. 1). It is up to homeland security leaders to create an environment conducive to collaboration by realizing that interconnectivity is a strength, not a hindrance.

## I. INTRODUCTION

According to the United States Office of Homeland Security, “To best protect the American people, homeland security must be a responsibility shared across our entire Nation” (2002, p. 5). Such a shared endeavor requires cooperation and collaboration, which is often in conflict with organizational cultures, demands on resources, and varying motivations (Temple, 2007, pp. 20–28). These complexities and those described herein are a source of confusion and frustration throughout the homeland security enterprise and likely cause the various stakeholders to wonder where they fit. The readers of this thesis may notice this initial theme is used to introduce the various chapters of this study. This is not an oversight, but instead it is purposefully reintroduced to draw attention to the competing complexities of this multifarious environment.

The 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security* transitions from a narrow focus on terrorism to an expansive all-hazards strategy. As a result, states and locals are forced to sustain operations without federal assets for a minimum of 72 hours (Carafano, 2008, p. 2). These broad expectations cause states and localities to attempt to *do everything* with limited resources, thereby potentially detracting from their day-to-day community commitments. Colonel Dean Esserman, the police chief in Providence, Rhode Island notes:

I have a healthy respect for the federal government and the importance of keeping this nation safe. . . . But I also live every day as a police chief in an American city where violence every day is not foreign and is not anonymous but is right out there in the neighborhoods (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1).

Chief Esserman’s comment reflects his frustration over deploying resources to combat violence in his community, while attempting to meet the demands of homeland security. Similar frustrations were noted by the participants of this research project. One local respondent noted, “It is apparent

that many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often times do not play well with each other” (Interviews, 2009).

Initially, it was presumed that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would help to overcome these issues and provide a direct opportunity for localities to engage with the federal government, thus, changing the government’s organizational culture and eliminating many of the prior complications and frustrations (Wortzel, 2003). However, after six years, “We have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to multiple homeland security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended and unintended consequences” (Bellavita, 2006). This confusing environment makes it difficult for anyone to know “with certainty what our homeland security strategy actually is” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 13), and how they may actually influence it in a positive direction.

In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Integration, Management, and Oversight, Representative Mike Rogers stated, “I think there is an integration problem among the agencies. I think there is a glaring problem of inadequate integration between the Homeland and the states and the local governments” (House. Committee on Homeland Security, 2005, p. 65). In other words, there is a lack of unified focus among the various homeland security stakeholders which prevents them from working together as a team across organizational boundaries.

Problems with integration and working together across boundaries draw attention to the need to enhance collaboration. Enhancing collaborative capacity results in synergy and innovation, thereby allowing the myriad of homeland security stakeholders to see value in joining together to combat the challenges of an ambiguous future. To address future challenges, Secretary Chertoff (2006), asserts the nation must urgently reorient its approach to homeland security with flexibility and resolve. It is argued throughout this thesis that reorienting the nation’s approach must involve efforts to enhance collaborative capacity as “The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution” (Klitgaard & Treverton,

2003, p. 8). A failure to embrace these challenges may encourage further enterprise degradation, as complacency and a failure to adapt to the changing environment may potentially lead to homeland security's demise. After all, even the once almighty dinosaurs failed to adapt and ultimately suffered extinction (Sagarin, 2003).

Considering collaborative capacity results from a compilation of factors such as communication, trust, leadership, and learning (Getha-Taylor, 2008), it is reasonable to conclude that when these and/or other elements are missing, the ability to enhance capacity suffers. Each of these elements surfaced during the research for this study (Interviews, 2009); some examples are noted below:

- Communication
  - Concern of open lane of communication. We hope we are getting the appropriate information to best serve the greater good.
  - Concerned about receiving the proper information and that we are being kept in the loop.
- Trust
  - Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies. Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. It is apparent that many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often times do not play well with each other.
  - My concern is other stakeholders may not take the threat seriously.
- Leadership
  - My primary concern on this incident is the reaction of the various layers of leadership among the responding agencies and governments.
  - Funding has caused turf wars among agencies. A cookie cutter approach was utilized by DHS in the appropriation of grant funds.
- Learning
  - Many agencies understand the need for cooperation. However, understanding the need and acting on it do not always happen in unison.

- Needs to be more joint training between local government and federal government. Locals and feds would be well served to form and enhance the personal relationships between the two groups.

The literature and thesis interviews (2009) reflect frustrated states/localities seek a flexible future of clarity, where the federal system listens and responds to concerns, and they (states and locals) have the autonomy to address jurisdiction specific demands. For example, the recent DHS Grant Requirement for localities to guard against improvised explosive devices (U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1) triggered frustration and confusion, as localities feel the federal government is not listening to their concerns and continues to force them to spend dollars on vague threats (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1–2). Although mandates such as this are frustrating, localities must comply, as they are dependent upon the grant funding to help offset the burdens of establishing and maintaining a state of readiness. Samuel Clovis (2006) refers to this federal leverage as coercive federalism; a command and control strategy that is not conducive to collaborative and cooperative relationships among the various levels of government. Therefore, it is reasonable to discern that coercive grant strategies function as disincentives to collaborative capacity.

In addition to the grant concerns are communication concerns. Repeatedly noted during the interviews (2009) conducted for this study was skepticism and mistrust surrounding the sharing of applicable information/intelligence. This is such a concern that the former national security advisor asserts the safest place for a terrorist is in the United States; that is, provided they do not do something to unnecessarily draw attention to his/herself (Burch, 2007).

In the United States, the primary responsibility for intelligence rest with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). However, there are numerous agencies engaged in intelligence collection and dissemination, as well as numerous oversight bodies. This fragmentation makes information sharing difficult and

confusing, which adds to the mistrust that clearly surfaced during this study (Interviews, 2009). The culmination of these and other concerns cause some to call for a domestic intelligence agency independent of the FBI. This in itself presents an entirely new set of concerns. After all, how will more bureaucracy make it easier to communicate with just fewer than 19,000 separate police agencies across the country?

For guidance, the nation must look to domestic intelligence successes around the world. Such an analysis, offers insight into potential improvements for United States domestic intelligence efforts. These improvements potentially provide clarity, which will assist in reducing the competition and confusion across the enterprise. A new/revised environment is likely more conducive to cooperation and collaboration, as it fosters trust and interdependency.

Considering these issues and in an effort to encourage evolution and enhance the overall homeland security enterprise, this research examines these challenges and proposes recommendations that will encourage collaboration in the complex world of homeland security. As used, the term *evolution* is intended to reflect growth and learning, where *growth* reflects development, not necessarily an increase of size. It is theorized that many of the answers lie in three significant and seemingly interconnected areas.

First, the research identifies problems surrounding collaboration between the various levels of government, thoroughly examines the applicable literature, and makes recommendations to enhance collaborative capacity throughout the homeland security enterprise. Second, the research identifies how the Department of Homeland Security Grant procedures may be revised to avoid functioning as a disincentive to collaboration. Recommendations are offered for improving the process, thereby contributing to the overall effort to build collaborative capacity. Third, the research examines the complexities surrounding intelligence sharing and seeks to make qualitative recommendations to enhance the nation's intelligence community. It is anticipated that research will support a revised/reformed strategy that improves communication, therefore,

positively contributing to efforts to enhance collaborative capacity throughout the homeland security enterprise. Collectively, the methodology of enhancing collaborative capacity will aid in helping all stakeholders understanding where they fit in the homeland security enterprise.

The application of evolutionary thinking to homeland security is in itself challenging, but even more challenging is the application of evolutionary thinking in a broad-based or macro manner to homeland security. Perhaps, this is caused by the enterprise's inability to imagine future threats, take risks, give up control, and/or strive for innovative solutions. Regardless, homeland security must continue to evolve with respect for civil liberties deeply rooted in the nation's federalist principles. This developmental process requires us all to collaborate and cooperate in an effort to enhance the overall homeland security enterprise.

The subsequent chapters examine applicable literature, published reports and studies, focus group feedback, and success factors within homeland security to offer recommendations for enhancing the positives and minimizing the negatives. The goal of this study is to help all homeland security stakeholders understand where they fit in the enterprise and better prepare the nation for the evolving challenges of an uncertain future.

## **A. ARGUMENT**

Is homeland security about terrorism? Is it all-hazards? Is it national security? The answer seems to be, "It depends." That is, it may be all hazards for localities, but terrorism for the Department of Defense. Because it is difficult to define and may mean different things to different stakeholders, the strategy to address homeland security concerns must be flexible and evolve depending upon the circumstances. However, there must be an effective mode of moving information/intelligence, referred to from this point forward as intelligence, throughout the enterprise. Such a timely flow of intelligence promotes situational awareness at all levels of government and lends itself to a more rigid structure/process.

Whether it is defining homeland security or swiftly moving intelligence, the homeland security enterprise is comprised of people, who must work together to deal future threats and uncertainty. Therefore, any strategic changes must consider the need to enhance cooperation and collaboration in this unique and complex world. For these reasons, it is argued in this thesis that the future includes a hybrid strategy, where some aspects are structured and others decentralized. It is believed that such an approach will create the synergy that will promote enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares the nation for the challenges of the future.

At the core of this argument are three main themes. These include the consolidation of homeland security grants, reforming domestic intelligence, and enhancing collaborative capacity. It is argued that homeland security grants with similar goals and objectives should be consolidated and administered as block grants to the states and locals. This process allows states and localities to address their unique homeland security needs in a manner consistent with national goals and objectives. These national goals and objectives provide the mission or ideology to enhance integration and capacity for national preparedness and prevention. In addition, local governments are able to meet the demands of their citizenry in manner consistent with federalist principles. Additionally, it is believed that this block-grant approach will encourage and facilitate small collaborations, thus promoting interaction and interdependency among jurisdictions. This decentralized approach will encourage the small collaborations to expand and evolve, therefore, promoting trust and building capacity.

Contrarily, research suggests that localities/states complain that existing intelligence sharing is inadequate. To address this dynamic, it is argued that reform is needed to establish a centralized structure that will aid in moving intelligence vertically and horizontally throughout the homeland security enterprise, thereby providing situational awareness and “connecting the dots” at the various levels of government (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon



the United States, 2004). As with the collaboration component, the free-flow of intelligence will promote enterprise-wide trust. While there have been some discussions across government that the remedy lies in the creation of a domestic intelligence agency, it is argued in this thesis that additional bureaucracy is not the answer. Instead, building upon existing organizational structures and expertise, FBI reform facilitates the consolidation of intelligence in an organization with an understanding of the criminal prosecution and the collection and dissemination of intelligence. It is believed such reform will promote situational awareness and a culture of preparedness.

While the critical reader may assert that centralization of intelligence will draw considerable resistance from states/locals, it is believed that this effort will initially be viewed as a trade off for the decentralization of grant funding to allow localities to address jurisdictional specific needs. Additionally, as the system develops and states/locals see positive outcomes, support will grow. Overtime, this hybrid strategy will enhance homeland security's capacity to collaborate, thereby creating the nation's *new normalcy* (Chertoff, 2006).

## **B. RESEARCH QUESTION**

Considering the complexities and ambiguities surrounding homeland security and the frustrations of the various security stakeholders, this research seeks to answer the question, "Where do we fit in the homeland security enterprise?" That is, how do the various homeland security stakeholders climb from the "bubbling swamp of intended and unintended consequences?" (Bellavita, 2006, p. 4). For the purposes of this thesis, the term "we" is periodically used to reflect the various homeland security stakeholders. The goal of this thesis is not to merely discuss the complexities of the problem. The goal of this thesis is to provide substantive recommendations that will serve to enhance the positives and reduce the negatives in an effort to promote further strategic innovation for the overall homeland security enterprise.

## II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Look to the essence of a thing, whether it be a point of doctrine, of practice, or of interpretation.

Marcus Aurelius (121–180)

Two hundred years after the United States Constitution was ratified, the nation still seeks the desired approach to effectively address the challenges of an uncertain future. Addressing these challenges appears to involve a better understanding what homeland security is, enhancing the ability to work together and share information throughout the enterprise, and understanding the environment that affects these dynamics. For these reasons, literature from three distinct areas is examined in this review. These are: the definition of homeland security, federalism, and collaborative capacity.

### A. HOMELAND SECURITY DEFINED

Homeland security is a relatively new concept that sparks great debate ranging from defining the term of homeland security to how to best navigate its ambiguous future. The *National Strategy for Homeland Security* defines homeland security as “A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur” (U.S. Homeland Security Council, 2007, p. 3). However, additional research supports an evolving homeland security definition based on the initial 2002 *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, 2006 *National Security Strategy*, and 2006 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (White House Office, 2008a & b, p. 1).

Christopher Bellavita (2008, p. 15) explored this evolving world of homeland security and asserts it is best described metaphorically as an ecosystem where the respective organisms represent their particular interest as they struggle to grow and evolve within a biological system. He describes seven

widely accepted definitions of homeland security, as depicted in the below table, but asserts each of the definitions represent a particular interest in the ecosystem.

Table 1. Bellavita's Definitions of Homeland Security (after Bellavita, 2008)

* Terrorism	* All Hazards
* Terrorism and Catastrophes	* Jurisdictional Hazards
* Meta Hazards	* National Security
* Security Über Alles "a symbol used to justify government efforts to curtail civil liberties" (Bellavita, 2008, p. 3)	

Bellavita (2008, pp. 3–4) argues that agreeing on a single definition implies that homeland security is machine-like. That is, the various parts of the machine are combined in a manner as to direct the behaviors of those who seek to make the machine function. This rigidity is not realistic, as the variety of interests in the homeland security system result in an absence of agreement, which "Can be seen as grist for the continued evolution of homeland security as a practice and as an idea" (Bellavita, 2008, p. 16).

In contrast, the *National Response Framework* supports structure and an all-hazards homeland security definition (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1). These primary documents guide much of the nation's homeland security efforts. Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, embraces the all-hazards definition, as it provides guidance for national preparedness. The all-hazards approach is largely based on the philosophy that the items and skills needed to address most emergencies are similar to those needed to prepare for and respond to terrorism (Bellavita, 2008, p. 4). However, Bellavita (2008, p. 4) also asserts, "There just is not that much terrorism in the United States to warrant spending the billions of dollars we have spent." Some in Congress assert the excessive spending is nothing more than "pork barrel funding, which has contributed little to national security" (Carafano, 2006).

Therefore, while the official position of the nation appears to be that homeland security is about all hazards, Bellavita's research supports a compilation of the various homeland security interests into a definition that evolves as the components of the system seek to advance their respective interest. This concept lends itself to the need to consider interpersonal relationships in any homeland security strategy, as a failure to do so likely dooms the strategy from the start.

The literature reflects that while there are many definitions of homeland security, there seems to be two overarching themes—the first being that of all hazards and the second related to the respective interests of those making up the homeland security environment. Regardless of the position taken, the literature supports the significance of evolution (growth and learning) as complacency and a failure to adapt to the changing environment may lead to the nation's demise (Sagarin, 2003, p. 2).

Although this portion of the literature provides an understanding of homeland security and its major themes, it is critical to understand that the homeland security is comprised of people who must work together to make improvements. Therefore, the next section seeks to build upon the definition of homeland security by examining literature associated with enhancing homeland security stakeholders' ability to collaborate.

## **B. COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY**

The literature surrounding collaborative capacity is largely focused on enhancing existing relationships in an effort to maximize the outcome of working together. As used, *collaborative capacity* is the product of "Such components as trust, communication, intellectual capital, creative opportunity, acceptance of leadership and *learning* . . . with the ability to learn being the most important" (Getha-Taylor, 2008, p. 126). Paul Mattessich (2005, p. 2), of the Wilder Research Center asserts, "Collaboration is a mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations to achieve common

goals.” Additionally, Mattessich (2005, p. 2) indicates collaboration among organizations is the most effective approach because of the complexity and scale of issues. The fact is “The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution” (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8).

The literature notes the significance of trust and leadership in enhancing the capacity of the relationship, as these elements are essential when dealing with uncertainty and risk taking. These components of the relationship encourage collaboration and allow members of the group to learn from one another, which promotes synergy (Kwon, 1998, pp. 1–5; Murphy, 2006, pp. 1–2). *Synergy* results from interactions that “Produce novel combined effects” (Corning, 2007, p. 113). Corning (2007, p. 116) asserts there are several types of synergy; however, as used above, synergy is the positive, and often unintended, effects of the collaboration being greater than that of a single stakeholder (Corning, 2007, p. 116).

Collectively, the literature supports Paul Mattessich’s (2005, pp. 9–29) six concepts for enhancing collaborative capacity. They are as follows:

- *Environment*: A history of collaboration and shared respect encourages understanding which promotes trust in the process.
- *Membership*: Include representatives from each entity affected by the relationship.
- *Process*: Promotes ownership and partners believe they will benefit from collaborating.
- *Communication*: Facilitates change over time to address the needs of the partners.
- *Purpose*: Goals and objectives are clear to each partner and are attainable.
- *Resources*: Skilled leadership for the collaborative group provides a sense of legitimacy.

Other authors offer a more in depth explanations into the respective categories, but overall, their research relates similarly to Mattessich’s work. Of

interest is Brafman and Beckstrom's (2006) book, *The Star Fish and the Spider*, in which decentralization is a key component of collaboration. The authors address Mattessich's resource component in the form of a catalyst, who initiates the idea or ideology, makes introductions, and then backs away from the collaboration allowing capacity to evolve through small trustful circles. This approach all but eliminates the traditional competitiveness associated with groups vying for similar goals. The goal or ideology unites the collaboration and becomes the guiding purpose for which small trustful circles evolve and innovate.

### **1. Challenges to Collaborative Capacity**

As the literature supports approaches to enhancing collaborative capacity, it also addresses numerous challenges. These challenges include such things as "Loss of control, loss of flexibility, loss of glory, and direct resource costs" (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, pp. 51–53). Others assert that collaborations are often complex, causing some to focus too heavily on the collaboration and neglecting the overall strategy. This is compounded by inevitable conflict, which many simply avoid or chose a political compromise, which causes a migration from original collaborative goal, discourages people from working together, and lessens productivity (Aamodt, 1999, p. 515; Blumenthal, 1995, pp. 1–6). Therefore, the literature cautions to avoid viewing collaboration as a panacea. Collaboration is filled with challenges and requires a "Balance of pitfalls, [and] advantages and disadvantages in favor of collaboration rather than individualism" (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992, p. 55).

Collectively, the literature supports enhancing collaborative capacity from the bottom up by building upon small trustful relationships or circles, as clearly, "The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution" (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8). Leadership, stakeholder representation, clear goals, and communication will aid in overcoming the challenges of the future. Table 2 summarizes this collaborative capacity section.

Table 2. Collaborative Capacity Highlights

Low Collaborative Capacity	Challenges	High Collaborative Capacity
Members avoid conflict	Stakeholders lose independent control	Trust facilitates collaboration in the absence of face-to-face meetings.
Group focuses too narrowly on the collaboration and sacrifices the overall strategy	Stakeholders lose independent flexibility	Group employs a collaborative style of conflict resolution, and shared oversight
Collaboration is compelled	Glory is for the collaborative group instead of individual stakeholders	Shared responsibility born from smaller trustful relationships
Lack trust results in suspicion of other stakeholders, which leads to a threatening environment	Conflict may keep people from working together and lessen productivity	Clear goals, objectives, and rewards
Collaborative champion(s) use role as a position of power	Unfamiliar stakeholders may lack trust	Collaborative leadership committed to championing the collaboration
Stakeholders believe collaboration is a panacea and fail to recognize the pitfalls	Unanticipated circumstances/events will impact the collaboration	The environment has a history of collaboration
Stakeholders fail to relinquish independent control	Politics will always create challenges	Effective and ongoing communication
Goals and objectives are not clearly communicated to stakeholders	Competition may discourage collaboration	Innovative technology networks smaller collaborative groups
	Communication barriers must be overcome	Mediation process to resolve disputes

As with the section on defining homeland security, the review of the collaborative capacity literature provides a foundation upon which to build. That is, success factors for a highly collaborative environment emerged that coupled with a better understanding of homeland security provide a basis to make recommendations for enhancing the homeland security enterprise. The next section seeks to explore the literature surrounding the nation's federalist principles in order to better understand the environment where the change is to occur.

### C. FEDERALISM

The literature in the area of federalism is vast, but well summarized by Samuel H. Clovis, Jr., Chair of the Department of Business Administration and Economics at Morningside College in Sioux City, Iowa.

Like Secretary Chertoff (2006, p. 1), Clovis (2006, p. 1) asserts future homeland security challenges “Require solutions for which the existing structures and paradigms must be changed to ensure the greatest level of preparedness possible.” His research supports a foundation in federalism when examining intergovernmental relations, as reorganizations have been driven by the nation’s reaction to significant events. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, a single piece of legislation combined 22 organizations into the Department of Homeland Security. From the onset, Secretary Ridge emphasized federalism as the nation’s guiding principle (Clovis, 2006, p. 1). Additionally, Keith Bea, Congressional Research Service, (2005, p. 5), supports a foundation in federalism. Both Bea and Clovis assert the following documents further solidify the foundation for homeland security and national preparedness:

- The National Planning Scenarios, 2004;
- The National Response Plan (NRP), 2004—Now replaced by the National Response Framework, 2008;
- The National Incident Management System (NIMS), 2004;
- The Universal Task List (UTL), 2005;
- The Interim National Preparedness Goal (The Goal), 2005;
- The Target Capabilities List (TCL), 2005
- The National Homeland Security Strategy, 2002 (Note: now replaced by the 2007 strategy);
- Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of
- Domestic Incidents (HSPD-5), 2003;
- The transcript of a speech given by then-Secretary Tom Ridge to the, National Association of Counties in March of 2004.



The nation's public policy goal is to "Gain the highest level of capability with the resources available" (Clovis, 2006, p. 2). To accomplish this, the literature indicates that over time, the various branches of government interpret the role of federalism differently, which results in conflict among the myriad of stakeholders. In his article, "Federalism, Homeland Security and National Preparedness: A Case Study in the Development of Public Policy," Clovis (2006, p. 3) discusses three emerging theories of federalism: cooperative, coercive, and competitive.

### **1. Cooperative**

The United States Constitution was founded on the concept of shared governance, in which each jurisdiction provides the necessary goods and services for its citizens (Clovis, 2006, pp. 3–4). The power for this arrangement is found in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which allows for all powers not specifically designated to the national government to be left to the states (Joint Commission on Printing, 2006, p. 5). A series of events, such as the adoption of the Amendments 16 and 17 and the passage of the New Deal gave decidedly more power to the federal government. These events resulted in the concept of cooperative federalism, where the principal of negotiation was essential in deciding on the role of each level of government (Clovis, 2006, pp. 3–4).

### **2. Coercive**

According to Clovis, "The promulgation of grant programs led to the inevitable expansion of the national government through the creation of more regulatory agencies to oversee the new programs" (2006, p. 6). Additionally, other legislation, such as the No Child Left Behind Act, had similar impact on state and local governments, as states were compelled to comply with its requirements (Clovis, 2006, p. 12). According to Krane, "The act was seen as . . . punitive and designed to identify problem schools without really dealing with the problems that are to be uncovered" (2007, p. 2). The regulatory control of the

grant programs expanded the power of the national government into a coercive form of federalism, where the national government gained leverage over the states. As Posner explains, “The trends toward the use of coercive tools have proven to be durable and long lasting, albeit punctuated by episodes of reform” (2007, p. 390). Posner (2009, p. 391) continues by noting coercive federalism causes states and localities to absorb the federally induced costs in a variety of ways:

- Statutory direct order mandates
- Grant conditions, both program specific and crosscutting
- Total statutory preemption
- Partial statutory preemption
- Federal income tax provisions affecting state and local tax base
- Regulatory actions taken by federal courts and agencies
- Regulatory delays and non-enforcement
- Federal exposure of state and local governments to liability lawsuits

This coercive process discourages cooperation because it places public officials on the defensive and causes conflict that extends far beyond the specific mandates (Posner, 2007, pp. 402–404). Clovis (2006, pp. 6–8), notes because of the national government’s expanding control, states are forced to utilize services and quality of life issues to compete for citizens.

### **3. Competitive**

Considering the coercive environment created by the evolving power of the federal government, local governments compete for citizens through services; that is, they seek to provide services and a secure environment that cause citizens to choose one jurisdiction over another. Such competition is necessary because citizens are closest to their local representatives. While all elected officials are subject to being voted out of office, the close relationship between local officials and their constituency makes them more accountable to

the citizens, and easier to vote out office. Therefore, states/localities seek to provide an environment that is responsive to the needs of its citizenry; a concept described as competitive federalism (Clovis, 2006, pp. 6–9). Under this theory, no society can provide total security; therefore, priorities must be set, and citizens choose the jurisdiction that best addresses their needs (Nivola, 2002, p. 1). In addition, this approach encourages jurisdictions to pool resources and collaborate on security issues, as no single jurisdiction can do it all.

Considering these concepts, the literature indicates federalism will continue to evolve as significant events impact the nation. This evolution of federalism is similar to Bellavitas's description of homeland security, in that the principals of federalism are largely based on disagreement for which the pursuit of a resolution is an evolutionary process (2008, p. 15). Considering this process, a strong emphasis is needed at the state/local level, as it is the closest point between the citizens and their representatives. However, the literature reflects a considerable gap between federal and local levels of government, as the role of the states has been minimized (Kettl, 2006). This minimization erodes at the principles of federalism. Interestingly, this minimization appears to be more of a practical practice, than a policy decision. This is evident in "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned," where it is reported:

The system . . . reflects the American system of federalism, allocating roles and responsibilities between levels of government by utilizing a layered system that requires local governments to first request assistance from their State. States, in turn, must use their own resources, if available, before requesting Federal assistance. (White House Office, 2006c, p. 72)

While the written documents support the use of balanced principles of federalism, the practical application of these policies tends to confuse stakeholders. Additionally, the literature is even less clear with regards to federalism's role in the future. One school of thought centers on an evolving concept of federalism, where the pendulum swings to a more powerful centralized national government following times of crisis. As time passes, the

pendulum moves back from the extreme ends. The other school of thought focuses more on rigid structure aimed at dictating the roles of the various levels of government. This compilation of literature seeks to compartmentalize governmental functions and delegate responsibilities to states and localities (Newman, 2002, pp. 126–131).

#### **D. SUMMARY**

In an effort to help create new approaches to dealing with future threats to the homeland, this literature review examined the major works in three large categories: the definition of homeland security, federalism, and collaborative capacity, all of which are heavily influenced by human interaction. These literature categories provide the basis for a better understanding of the nature of the governmental power—the environment in which homeland security stakeholders must function; a better understanding of what homeland security is to the various stakeholders; and success factors for working collaboratively in this complex enterprise.

Overall, defining homeland security is complex and includes varying perspectives. First, homeland security is primarily about national efforts to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States. Second, there is no single homeland security definition; it is defined differently depending upon the circumstances and jurisdiction. Third, homeland security is a compilation of competing interests and will evolve over time.

With regards to federalism, one grouping of the literature indicates federalism will evolve as significant events impact the nation, while another group advocates structure, hierarchy, and delegation of responsibilities. However, collectively the literature supports a future based on the foundations of federalism and balancing the needs of the nation with the civil liberties of its citizens.

The literature surrounding the final category of collaborative capacity advocates building upon small, established relationships, where there is a history

of trust and working together. These relationships provide the foundation for enhancing collaborative capacity and facilitating progress during challenging times. However, the literature cautions that while collaboration is preferred, it must not be viewed as a panacea.

These three groups of literature support an evolving future. That is, the literature establishes a basis for understanding how it is that homeland security stakeholders find themselves wondering where they fit in the homeland security enterprise, and it provides support for comprehensive enhancements that will promote growth and learning within the enterprise. It is anticipated that such growth and learning (evolution) will lead to a nation better prepared to deal with future threats.

Generally, efforts to produce rigidity and structure seem to encourage disagreement and discourage collaboration; however, some circumstances may warrant structure. Bellavita argues an absence of agreement is often the catalyst for continued evolution (2008, p. 16). A similar nexus was discovered when examining the literature on federalism. The increased coercive power of the federal government (coercive federalism) encourages competition and disconnect between the various levels of government. Because state and local governments compete for citizens (competitive federalism) by providing the desired services, citizens are forced choose one jurisdiction over another. This competition likely results in further disagreement, which leads to an evolutionary outcome that may be positive in some instances and negative in others. Lastly, the literature supports an evolutionary process for enhancing collaborative capacity by working through conflict with a bottom-up philosophy of building large-scale collaboration from small trustful relationships.

Collectively, the literature reflects that shaping the future of homeland security involves enhancing stakeholder collaboration through a common goal or ideology grounded in the principles of federalism. However, the underlying theme seems to indicate that any strategy or plan for the future must consider the

significance of flexibility and evolution, as the homeland security enterprise is comprised of human beings that often choose their own competing interest over the grand ideology.

The Gilmore Commission (2003, p. 1) notes that terrorism will not disappear. Therefore, the entire homeland security enterprise must work together, as a nation failing to work collectively and innovate may find itself like the once all-powerful dinosaurs—extinct (Sagarin, 2003, p. 2).

## **E. WHAT IS MISSING?**

The remainder of this thesis will seek to add value to this compilation of literature, as it appears to be missing specific recommendations for enhancing cooperation and collaboration in the unique and complex world of homeland security. Additionally, the literature appears to reflect an either/or approach to structure within homeland security. As noted in the argument, the future may lie in between; a hybrid approach where some aspects are structured and others decentralized, thereby providing some sense of order to a decentralized, but interdependent enterprise. It is anticipated that such an approach will result in the synergy that will evolve enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares the nature for the uncertainties of the future.

The goal of this thesis is to promote an understanding of where homeland security stakeholders fit in the homeland security enterprise. It is anticipated that if the various components of the homeland security enterprise understand their roles and contributions, then they will be empowered to direct their energy towards promoting the positives and reducing the negatives; thus, collaboratively enhancing the enterprise towards the Gilmore Commission's (2003) new normalcy.

To this point, stakeholder frustrations reflect considerable disconnect within the homeland security enterprise. State and local officials report the need to address problems unique to their respective jurisdictions. Literature

surrounding defining homeland security, understanding federalism, and enhancing collaborative capacity were examined to provide the foundation and capacity to offer recommendations for increasing the positives and decreasing the negatives throughout the enterprise. The next chapter examines the selection and feedback from study participants to identify specific concerns/issues in an effort to offer comprehensive recommendations applicable across the homeland security enterprise.

### **III. METHODOLOGY**

Search men's governing principles, and consider the wise, what they shun and what they cleave to.

Marcus Aurelius (121-180)

#### **A. RESEARCH SCOPE**

It is widely accepted that protecting the American people is a responsibility to be shared across the nation. This shared responsibility presents many challenges ranging from human conflict to organizational structure. As previously reported, the research reflects a homeland security enterprise suffering from a lack of trust, fragmented communications, and inadequate funding mechanisms. To date, much of the applicable research offers a reflective perspective on historical mistakes, or merely “admires the problem” (Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 19). While this is certainly an important component, as one must build on lessons learned, this perspective offers little in proactively shaping the nation's ability to effectively navigate the uncertain future. This is in large part due to the myriad of homeland security influences and the fact that traditional approaches cause corrective action to be taken largely in an effort to prevent a reoccurrence of a specific undesired outcome.

Therefore, this study examines the views and perspectives of current homeland security practitioners at four levels of government: local, state, regional, and federal. It is narrowly designed to glean insight into the manner in which these individuals assess an evolving crisis, as well as their perspective of the others' abilities. The term *perspective* lends itself to emotion and subjectivity, which are significant, as these elements are frequently involved in matters of trust, which the literature asserts is essential to building collaborative capacity. It is theorized that enhancing collaborative capacity will result in a resilient and evolving enterprise capable of effectively dealing with uncertainty.



## **B. RESEARCH STRATEGY**

Considering the complexities of this evolving environment, this study was conducted utilizing a hybrid methodology involving an examination of literature, published reports and studies, and focus group feedback. This research strategy was selected due to the two major themes of the author's argument. First, decentralize homeland security's operational components; that is, give localities the flexibility and autonomy to address their unique homeland security needs in a manner consistent with national goals and objectives. Second, centralize/consolidate intelligence functions to facilitate situational awareness and free-flow of timely and accurate intelligence. A study of consolidating/centralizing intelligence seems best served by examining existing successes and challenges of another intelligence community. Such an analysis addresses the key aspects of the author's argument and is detailed in Chapter VI. This particular section will focus on feedback from participants with established equity in homeland security at each level of government.

This study was conducted in a manner to reflect the author's ability to provide comprehensive and informed recommendations about enhancing the future of homeland security. Eight research participants with a true capacity to comment on the positive and negative elements of their respective homeland security environment were selected to add present-day value to this study. The participants selected for this study consisted of the following:

- Two local police executives, one of which is a municipal police chief. Each local participant has in excess of 20 years of law enforcement experience and has coordinated numerous large-scale events requiring the coordination of multiple agencies, one of which when was a tornado that ripped through a metropolitan area at the height of rush-hour.
- Each of the two state representatives has worked closely with Virginia's Office of Commonwealth Preparedness and served as the Virginia State Police's Homeland Security Coordinator. One representative has 26 years of service and the other, 15. Their

work has involved cross-discipline coordination with agencies at all levels of government including the Strategic National Stockpile, weapons of mass destruction response, and Pandemic flu coordination and response.

- Each of the two regional participants represented different agencies in the National Capital Region. These individuals both have in excess of 20 years of law enforcement experience and have been involved in numerous significant incidents, including responding to and coordinating events at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
- Each of the two federal participants represents national law enforcement agencies and each have in excess of 20 years of service. Both have considerable experience in inter-agency coordination, and both have worked in and around major metropolitan areas for the majority of their careers. Both have expert knowledge in weapons of mass destruction, national incident management, and terrorism response/investigations.

In addition to the electronic interview, each participant was afforded an opportunity to provide additional input regarding the research process and/or matters not thoroughly exposed in the interview. The identity of these individuals remains anonymous in accordance with the academic policies of the Naval Postgraduate School's IRB Process. Anonymity was essential in order to ensure that the participants were comfortable discussing issues/concerns surrounding the complexities of the homeland security enterprise. Absent this arrangement, it is highly probable that the participants would have been less willing to participate in this study.

Interviews were constructed in a manner to assess participants' responses to a given critical incident involving collaboration among the various homeland security stakeholders. Additionally, the feedback sought to identify the expectations of the various participants, their confidence in one another, and their views on what is working well and what needs to be improved in homeland security. The apparent subjectivity of the participants' responses is acknowledged and viewed as valuable to the research process. Such responses reflect the nuances of the various relationships that positively and negatively

influence the homeland security enterprise. Additionally, the responses serve to identify gaps in the actual and expected outcomes of various stakeholders. Ignoring these complexities would be irresponsible and would likely result in recommendations doomed to fail, as they would be blindly implemented in a unknown environment.

At a macro level, the goal was to examine the interaction among the various levels of government within the given scenario, while simultaneously identifying the positives and negatives affecting the capacity for enhanced collaboration. Readers of this study may notice a limited number of participants; two law enforcement executives from each level of government. This sampling pool was purposefully selected for their considerable knowledge, experience, and understanding of the dynamics and entirety of their respective level of government. In addition to the number of participants, the particular discipline of law enforcement is itself, a small sampling of the overall homeland security enterprise. However, the emphasis of this study is not the discipline of law enforcement, right or wrong actions, or an evaluation of resource deployment. Instead, emphasis is placed on the interaction between the various levels of government to identify potential gaps in the homeland security enterprise that draws attention to positive and negative influences. The human and social components of the research support the use of inductive reasoning to identify commonality and differences among the responses in an effort to make recommendations that have applicability across the enterprise.

It is anticipated that this study will produce areas for additional research. The reader is encouraged to explore these new areas and build upon this study in an effort that the improvements enhance the nation's ability to effectively meet and exceed the demands of an uncertain future. These areas of additional research are identified in Chapter VII.

### C. INTERVIEW RESULTS

Participants of this study were asked to respond to a series of questions relating to two specific scenarios each with subsequent injects. The questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix B of this document. Following each scenario, a Likert Scale was used to assess the degree to which each participant agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about interagency collaborations as related to the respective scenario. Participant responses were recorded on a scale ranging from one to five, with five representing a strong agreement with the statement and one representing strong disagreement. This scale was selected for its accuracy and ability to “Measure attitudes and other factors” when responding to a series of statements (Intelligent Measurement, 2007, p. 1). The last section of the interview included general homeland security questions and an assessment of the participant’s level of confidence with the other levels of government. The subsequent paragraphs identify the key findings of the study, while many of the specific narrative comments are to be incorporated throughout the remainder of this thesis document.

***Note:** During the collection of data for this particular thesis, the willingness of state and local participants was clearly evident, as they were eager to offer candid comments and completed the electronic interviews in a timely manner. Contrarily, numerous attempts to secure more than a single regional participant willing to provide an interview failed. Additionally, despite discussing the scenarios and federal responses, one federal executive opted out of the survey at the last minute, noting his respective agency’s legal department prohibited him from completing the questionnaire. It would be very easy for the author to draw conclusions from this reluctance to participate. At the very least, such reluctance may be indicative of the problem; that is, if stakeholders are not willing to candidly discuss the problems, how can the causative factors be understood and the homeland security enterprise enhanced. Nevertheless, the author was able*

*to glean specific insight into both regional and federal positions from the two interviews returned, as well as from telephonic conversations with the two reluctant participants.*

## **1. Scenario One**

*Intelligence feeds indicate with high certainty that a small group acquired explosives and planned to detonate a device near a large metropolitan area in Virginia. Intelligence indicates the group will use a rental van to move the device into the center of the respective metropolitan area.*

*Inject: Undetected, the device detonates at metropolitan's center. Most buildings within 3,200 feet of the device are destroyed and/or severely damaged. Injuries and deaths are substantial.*

Of significance in this scenario was that each level (of government) indicated that their role during this scenario was assisting and/or working in conjunction with other agencies. However, local and state levels expressed great concern about interagency cooperation and communication. Interestingly, locals were most concerned about the disconnect between the local and federal levels and did not mention state involvement at all. On the other hand, state participants noted serious concerns that localities would resist their assistance and, therefore, fail to act in a timely manner. Additionally, when asked what level of government was in charge at the scene, all levels reported that the federal level was in charge. However, the federal level reported a unified command would be utilized to manage the scene. These responses reflect uncertainty with regards to each level of government's place in the scenario and tremendous skepticism of the other. This appears to reflect a lack of confidence and trust.

Regarding the statements of confidence following this scenario, each level appeared to be fairly confident in their own ability to fulfill their role in this scenario. However, the federal level reported great concern with the quality of training of the other responders, while the local level expressed concern over the level of competency of the other responders. When asked about the degree of

preparedness, the regional and federal levels reported a high level of preparedness for this type of situation. As for collaboration and understanding one's role during the scenario, states reported the least confidence in everyone's ability to collaborate effectively with little conflict, and both local and state reported concerns in understanding one's role during the scenario.

Again, these responses appear to indicate a lack of confidence and trust, primarily at the state and local levels. However, the regional and federal levels seem to indicate greater confidence in cross-collaboration.

## **2. Scenario Two**

*You receive a citizen report of an unusual situation. The citizen reports seeing a truck driving through the streets of a densely populated area while spraying something from a cylinder into the air. Local police respond and locate the abandoned truck, which appears to have completely disbursed the substance. Intelligence and initial investigation indicate the substance may be hazardous. Inject: Further investigation reveals the substance is aerosolized anthrax and several first responders and citizens have been exposed.*

As with the first scenario, there was an apparent confusion with each level's role during the scenario; however, each level eventually yielded control to the federal level. Initially, both the federal and local levels reported being the primary agency, while state and regional immediately assumed a supportive and/or collaborative position. Of great significance were the responses to "What if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other homeland security stakeholders?" Each level of government reported concerns over possible inactivity by the others, uncertainty about the willingness to cooperate, poor communications, a failure of some to accept assistance before it is too late, and inappropriate information dissemination. Other noteworthy areas centered on local concerns for sustainability and inadequate communications and state concerns with in improper handling of incident management, including not being equipped to effectively deal with weaponized anthrax.

Regarding the statements of confidence following this scenario, each level again appeared to be fairly confident in their own ability to fulfill their role in this scenario. (This contradicts earlier state comments of inadequate equipment for a weaponized anthrax response and handling). With regards to appropriate policies, strategies, and guidelines to effectively deal with this scenario, the local level expressed the greatest concern, while the federal level was most confident. Both local and state expressed concern about being prepared for this type of scenario; and as for collaboration, regional reflected the highest degree of confidence in the responders' ability to work together with little conflict. It is anticipated that this is in large part because the regional concept is itself collaborative in nature.

### **3. General Questions**

In addressing the general questions, many of the trends already discussed were repeated. Of significance was local concern over not receiving adequate information, the need to address local issues, and the potential for conflict between local and federal levels. State level is concerned about inter-agency cooperation, limited training and experience, and a lack of homeland security leadership. Regional level reported no specific concerns, while the federal level reported the positive relationships formed from the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). The federal level expressed concern over appropriate information sharing and guarding against complacency. Overall, each level of government acknowledged that homeland security is everyone's concern.

The subsequent confidence scale reflected that the state is most concerned about the capabilities and response of the local and regional levels. However, all levels are generally confident in the capabilities of the federal response. With the exception of the state responses, all others reflected a tendency towards neutrality when assessing the capabilities of the other level of

governments. This neutral position may be caused by a sense of political correctness or is a result of a knowledge gap associated with the capabilities of the various stakeholders.

#### **D. SUMMARY**

The preceding paragraphs framed the scenarios and identified several points of interest. Collectively, the interview responses identified concerns involving uncertainty about roles during a major incident, inadequate information sharing, multiple roles, and interpersonal conflicts. These reflect low levels of trust and capacity to collaborate.

Contrarily, the interviews reflected positives with regards to the level of confidence in the respective level of government's own capabilities. Additionally, governments generally feel they are more prepared now than a few years earlier, and all participants unanimously believe homeland security is everyone's responsibility.

These observations are similar to those expressed by homeland security stakeholders nationwide, as articulated throughout this thesis. For example:

- I have a healthy respect for the federal government and the importance of keeping this nation safe. . . . But I also live every day as a police chief in an American city where violence every day is not foreign and is not anonymous but is right out there in the neighborhoods (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1).
- More openly than at any time since the Sept. 11 attacks, local authorities have begun to complain that the federal financing for domestic security is being too closely tied to combating potential terrorist threats, at a time when they say they have more urgent priorities (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, p. 1)
- There is uneven coordination . . . among State and local governments. For example, our States and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas (White House Office, 2006c, p. 67).



These statements, along with the literature, reports, and studies reasonably support the thesis findings correlation across the homeland security enterprise. Additionally, more detailed participant responses are to be incorporated throughout the thesis reflecting applicability with the respective literature and the nation as a whole.

## **E. MOVING FORWARD—CHAPTERS**

The research objective is to provide recommendations to reduce the negatives and enhance the positives in a manner that will offer a new path forward and improve the overall homeland security enterprise thereby, helping to understand where the various components all fit. The subsequent chapters will address the participants' feedback by exploring the potential causative factors in an effort to bridge the gaps identified and offer recommendations for the future.

As noted in the argument and supported by the author's research, significant gaps exist in collaboration and information flow. It is believed that the current DHS grant process erodes at collaborative efforts by injecting high levels of competition between jurisdictions, as well minimizing the roles of the states. This dynamic was identified by one state participant during the research, and it appears to add further conflict to an already complex environment.

To this point, this study identified many of the problems/concerns associated with the ambiguity of the homeland security enterprise. Seeking to establish a capacity for addressing these problems/concerns, applicable literature was examined in the areas of defining homeland security, enhancing collaborative capacity, and understanding the role of federalism. This section, examined the views and perspectives of current homeland security practitioners at four levels of government: local, state, regional, and federal to glean insight into specific concerns surrounding the interaction of the various levels of government during an evolving critical incident. Moving ahead, the subsequent chapters will address the following areas:

- Building collaborative capacity
- Promoting collaboration through an enhanced DHS grant process
- Improving information/intelligence flow

The next chapter, Building Collaborative Capacity, addresses a bottom-up philosophy of enhancing collaborations from small trustful relationships. This is important, as it is the foundation of support for both a decentralized grant process and a more organized/structured information flow.

This study will conclude with specific recommendations to enhance the positives, and minimize the negatives in an effort to promote a more efficient, effective, and prepared homeland security enterprise, thereby helping to answer the question, “Where do we fit in the homeland security enterprise?”

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## **IV. BUILDING COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY**

Error is the force that welds men together; truth is communicated to men only by deeds of truth

Leo Tolstoy (1828–1910)

### **A. COLLABORATIVE CAPACITY**

As noted during the interviews and existing research, the entire nation must collaborate and share in the responsibility of homeland security (U.S. Office of Homeland Security, 2002). However, such collaboration is complicated by challenges created from various organizational cultures, demands on resources, and motivations. These complexities often function as disincentives to cooperation and collaboration (Temple, 2007). These barriers are evident in the interview responses, where one local participant wrote that he is “Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies” (Interviews, 2009). Additionally, he commented that he is “Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. It is apparent that many Federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often times do not play well with each other” (Interviews, 2009). This section will focus on overcoming the barriers to collaboration by building upon small trustful relationships.

Initially, it was thought that the Department of Homeland Security would provide a direct opportunity for localities to engage with the federal government, thus, changing the government’s organizational culture and eliminating many of the prior complications and frustrations noted above (Wortzel, 2003). However, after six years, “We have lots of people and organizations making and reacting to multiple homeland security decisions, generating a bubbling swamp of intended and unintended consequences” (Bellavita, 2006, p. 4).

In his testimony before the House Subcommittee on Integration, Management, and Oversight, Representative Mike Rogers stated, “I think there is

an integration problem among the agencies. I think there is a glaring problem of inadequate integration between the Homeland and the states and the local governments” (House Committee on Homeland Security, 2005, p. 65). Two years after Rogers’s testimony, it is apparent that such problems still exists, as noted throughout the interviews conducted for this thesis:

- Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies.
- Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals.
- It is apparent that many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often times do not play well with each other.
- Concerned local agencies would resist the immediate assistance being offered by the state and federal agencies. (Interviews, 2009)

It is clear that considerable gaps exist among the various homeland security stakeholders; this discourages them from working together as a team across organizational boundaries.

The 2008 *National Response Framework* and the 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, both support a homeland security definition that addresses *all-hazards*. These documents guide much of the nation’s homeland security efforts. Additionally, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, embraces the all-hazards definition; it provides guidance for national preparedness. The all-hazards approach is largely based on the philosophy that the items and skills needed to address most emergencies are similar to those needed to prepare for and respond to terrorism (Bellavita, 2008). This all-hazards concept involves a compilation of the various homeland security interests, which appears to cause individual jurisdictions to seek to advance their respective interest, thus promoting competition. Such competition likely discourages collaboration, thereby causing some to focus inward on their respective jurisdictions. This seems dangerous and counterproductive:

It's a mistake to think that any single agency [and/or jurisdiction] could completely fulfill the required roles. Indeed, for any complex situation anywhere in the world, it's become obvious that there is no one authority . . . that can single handedly save the day. (Gerencser, Lee, Napolitano, & Kelly, 2008, p. 26)

Therefore, jurisdictions must seek to enhance their collaborative capacity in an effort to jointly address future challenges. As used, *collaborative capacity* is the product of "Such components as trust, communication, intellectual capital, creative opportunity, acceptance of leadership and *learning* . . . with the ability to learn being the most important" (Getha-Taylor, 2008, p. 126).

Collaboration is clearly a necessary component of any future homeland security strategy. Secretary Chertoff (2006) asserted the nation needed to reorient with urgency, flexibility, and resolve. The essential aspect of his claim appears to be flexibility, as this supports an evolutionary process. The nation must remain vigilant against complacency and seek to evolve continuously, as a failure to adapt to the changing environment may potentially lead to the nation's demise. According to Raphael Sagarin (2003, p. 3), "The planet's diversity tells us that evolution works. But the number of failed life forms is sobering. Even the once dominant organisms such as dinosaurs could not avoid extinction."

To avoid similar circumstances the nation must capitalize on the synergy of collaborative initiatives, as collaboration among organizations is the most effective approach due to the complexity and scale of issues (Mattessich, 2005). In this case, *synergy* is the novel combined effect of interaction. While there are several types of synergy, the focus here is that the positive, and often unintended, effects of collaboration are greater than that of a single homeland security stakeholder (Corning, 2007). Mattessich (2005, p. 4) indicates successful collaboration is dependent upon a commitment to a "Definition of mutual relationships and goals; a jointly developed structure and shared responsibility; mutual authority and accountability for success; and sharing or resources and rewards." Furthermore, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, p. 250) advocate the importance of trust, noting, "There is mounting evidence

demonstrating that where parties trust each other, they are more willing to engage in cooperative activity through which further trust may be generated.”

According to the applicable literature, collaboration is mutually beneficial and leads to the achievement of common goals and rewards (Mattessich, 2005, p. 2). Moreover, it is the “Most effective approach because of the complexity and scale of issues” (Mattessich, 2005, p. 2). It is evident in the thesis interviews that jurisdictions see value in collaboration; one participant noted a desire for “Face-to-face meetings quarterly to discuss past, present, and future issues” (Interviews, 2009). By working together collaborative synergy will assist in dealing with the unanticipated challenges caused by an uncertain future (Moynihan, 2005; Murphy, 2006).

However, effective collaboration often requires a loss of control, flexibility, and glory (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). These circumstances will ultimately produce conflict and many will seek to avoid such conflict, thereby sacrificing the benefits of synergy (Aamodt, 1999; Blumenthal, 1995). This encourages dispute resolution through a political compromise, which causes a migration from the original collaborative goal (Blumenthal, 1995). Unfortunately, compelling organizations to cooperate is ineffective and leads to suspicion of one another by the affected partners (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). Interestingly, the thesis interviews reflected the greatest level of suspicion at the state and local levels. This may in part be due to the federal government’s efforts to compel or coerce cooperation through various mandates (Posner, 2007). This dynamic draws attention to the concept of coercive federalism, which is further exasperated by the various DHS grant requirements and mandates. This is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Considering these pros and cons of collaboration, efforts to enhance collaborative capacity must start at the microlevel; that is, individual relationships are at the core of larger inter-organizational collaborations. Huxham and Macdonald (1992) indicate individuals develop trustful relationships that evolve and incorporate more people. Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) further support

this concept in their book, *The Starfish and the Spider*. The authors note small individual relationships evolve collaborative capacity independently and in spite of a hierarchical structure. To further enhance this capacity, a champion, or as Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) note, a *catalyst*, is necessary for such evolution to occur. Huxham and MacDonald (1992) caution that care must be taken to avoid presenting the champion as a power figure, as partners to the collaboration may view this person as a threat. Therefore, a small group of champions comprised of the significant partners will likely minimize the perceived threat and provide a sense of legitimacy to the collaboration. Brafman and Beckstrom (2006) offer a similar strategy but suggest the catalyst motivate the collaboration and then back away, thereby allowing capacity to build from within the group/community, and not around the catalyst.

Nevertheless, building upon the established trust of a few, the collective leadership will serve as a collaborative model for the various partners. It is important to note that the term leadership should not be interpreted as a means of creating command and control; the approach must truly reflect the interest of all stakeholders. This approach to enhancing the collaborative capacity is consistent with Mattessich's (2005) success factors:

- *Environment*: By building upon small trustful relationships, a history of collaboration is established, which will serve to establish an environment where collaboration is expected.
- *Membership*: By including the representation from all partners in the collaboration, and the significant partners in a group of collective champions, the stakeholders may be less threatened and feel included in the collaboration.
- *Process*: "The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution" (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8). Employing this concept as the guiding principle, allow the partners to understand the need and benefit of collaboration, thereby encouraging ownership.
- *Communication*: The collective champions keep the larger group informed, which aids in Huxham's and Macdonald's (1992, p. 6)



active process philosophy by tipping the “Balance of pitfalls, advantages and disadvantages in favor of collaboration rather than individualism.”

- *Purpose:* As with communication, the role of the champions is to guide the collaboration through uncertainty. Although homeland security is filled with uncertainty, clear goals and objectives allow partners to compare the collaboration to expectations, thereby seeing the benefits of the relationship.
- *Resources:* With skilled and vested champions, leadership legitimizes the collaboration and guides the collective group through the challenges of an uncertain future.

The evaluation of literature indicates compelling collaboration is ineffective, as it leads to suspicion of one another by the affected partners (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). Such suspicion leads to conflict, which may “Keep people from working together . . . [and] lessen productivity” (Aamodt, 1999, p. 515). This conflict may potentially destroy the collaboration. Therefore, enhancing collaborative capacity must evolve from the smallest level, in lieu of being mandated from the top of a hierarchical structure.

## **B. CASE STUDY**

In evaluating this approach to enhancing collaborative capacity, the article “Government Agencies Build Stronger Foundations for Sharing Information” (2008, p. 1), is offered as a very brief case study or example of collaborative capacity at work. The article acknowledges that while the benefits of information sharing are clearly evident, they are very difficult to achieve. However, “Collaboration with entities outside the government is becoming more feasible as easier-to-use collaboration platforms emerge” (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1).

In this case, a small group within the *trusted environment* of Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), identified a problem regarding the lack of “Comprehensive visibility throughout the life of the case [criminal investigative

case] (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1). Recognizing the need for a collaborative approach, the group championed this initiative and gathered information. They explored potential solutions deciding “To automate processes within and across communities” (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1). Upon selection of a system integrator, the group tested their prototype with stakeholders, informing them of the *process and communicating the purpose* (Mattessich, 2005). Understanding the challenges of this integration, the group sought a “Voice for a community . . . [which] required a lot of consensus building and policy knowledge” (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1).

The group embraced this active and challenging process by communicating with the stakeholders and seeking as much commonality as possible in their model. The process incorporated phased implementation with ongoing testing and feedback. Through this integrative system:

Case management has been created across five major user communities. The system also integrates multiple applications . . . In meeting those challenges, [Department of Navy Criminal Justice Information System] DONCJIS will achieve a sophisticated level of functionality that is difficult to attain but when successful, offers a high-value return (“Government Agencies Build,” 2008, p. 1).

That is, the stakeholders are able to clearly see the benefits of the collaboration.

This brief analysis supports the evolution of small, trustful relationships as the means to enhancing collaborative capacity. The group, with a history of collaboration built upon the existence of trustful relationships—*environment*. They included representatives from entities affected by the relationship—*membership*. They incorporated established processes and innovative technology that encouraged a model of commonality, which demonstrated how the stakeholders benefited from the collaboration—*process*. The group of skilled leaders provided clear goals and objectives and provided continuous feedback—*communication, purpose, and resources*. This case study exemplifies how small bottom-up approaches effectively enhance collaborative capacity.

## C. CONCLUSION

Changing organizational philosophies and building trustful relationships are difficult, but necessary, as the thesis interviews clearly articulate significant barriers still interfere with collaborative efforts. The research discussed throughout this chapter supports a bottom-up approach based on small trustful relationships that evolve through the leadership that serves as a catalyst or champion for change. The research supports the following success factors for enhancing collaborative capacity:

- As relationships are an evolutionary process, seek established relationships between individuals or small groups as a source for change. These smaller collaborations likely include mechanisms for conflict resolution and trust necessary for the challenges of uncertainty.
- Bring new members to the group who can contribute and add value to the desired goals and objectives. This inclusive process will allow the group to grow its capacity, encourage ownership, and enhance the group's synergy.
- Have more than one champion. This collective leadership will not only be a model for the collaboration, but it will minimize the perceived threat associated with a single position of power and provides legitimacy to the collaboration. Consider the use of a catalyst to stimulate the collaboration and then back away.
- Communicate, communicate, and communicate: informed stakeholders understand the process, where they fit, and what the collaboration seeks to achieve. Embrace the concept: "The task ahead is too formidable for any single institution" (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003, p. 8). This will encourage stakeholders to engage and own the process.

The collective research supports a homeland security future that involves a compilation of the various homeland security interests (Bellavita, 2008). Because of these varying and sometimes competing interests, enhancing the collaborative capacity is essential to overcome the complexity and scale of

issues (Mattessich, 2005). The process of enhancing collaborative capacity is evolutionary and must grow from small trustful relationships/circles. Raphael Sagarin (2003, p. 3) asserts, "The real challenge is to apply evolutionary thinking to homeland security in a more structured and broad-based manner." He indicates, "The United States is the most dominant presence on the Earth today, but terrorist networks such as al Qaeda represent a ruthless adversary. Terrorism poses an evolutionary challenge; it should be treated like one" (Sagarin, 2003, p. 3).

However, the challenges are difficult, as stakeholders will lose independent control, flexibility, and glory (Huxham & Macdonald, 1992). While these challenges are formidable, they are not insurmountable. As a nation, it must not be allowed that "Our fears to blind us to the possibilities of excellence" (Quinn, 1996, p. 11). Collaboration is an empowering environment. When engaged in this environment, "People are most likely to take risks, experience success, and then feel empowered themselves" (Quinn, 1996, p. 228).

As evident from the thesis interviews, suspicion and distrust continues to be an issue across levels of government, which demonstrates the need for improvements. Noting the value of collaboration, one state participant wrote:

The overall objective is to establish positive working relationships in advance of "the real thing" so that when faced with a live event, incident managers will already be familiar . . . and will be more likely to work together to resolve an incident (Interviews, 2009).

However, in order to positively influence the future, collaboration must extend beyond any single incident/project and become a normative behavior. As with the NCIS case study, trustful collaborative relationships exist on small scales throughout the homeland security environment. Cultivating and building upon these will enhance overall collaborative capacity.

This approach to enhancing collaborative capacity supports an evolving homeland security definition that is comprised of a myriad of interconnected stakeholders. Many of these stakeholders already have well-established

relationships that are the foundation for the future. As they search for ways to make their communities and jurisdictions safer, while simultaneously respecting the concepts of federalism, they must be provided the tools and the autonomy to address their unique needs before it can be expected that they will more fully engage at a national level.

The next chapter suggests an approach that seeks to create an environment that will further stimulate engagement at the lowest possible level. Using the same bottom-up philosophy discussed in this collaborative capacity section, it is anticipated that a decentralize DHS grant process will provide the funding and autonomy that will stimulate growth and evolution from the bottom of the homeland security enterprise.

In Ed Kenerson's (2008, p. 13) book, *The Cabin in the Woods*, he reminds the reader, "Change is never optional . . . but, growth always is." As homeland security stakeholders seek to build a better future, they must never forget that "The foundation is the most important part" (Kenerson, 2008, p. 40). That is, the bottom of the homeland security enterprise must be solid before it can be expected that changes to other aspects of the enterprise to withstand the challenges of an uncertain future.

## **V. COLLABORATION THROUGH AN ENHANCED DHS GRANT PROCESS**

Some strange thoughts transcend our wonted themes, And into  
glory peep.

Henry Vaughan (1622–1695)

As evident from the previous chapter, collaboration is best enhanced in trustful environments, where small groups or circles develop close bonds. These circles then evolve as trust and interdependence grow. Additionally, the concept of cooperative federalism provides that each jurisdiction is responsible for providing the necessary goods and services for its citizens; security is among the essential services. As mentioned previously, jurisdictions currently compete with each other for homeland security funding. This competition appears to promote distrust and isolationism, as each jurisdiction seeks to demonstrate a greater need than the other stakeholders. This seems to encourage jurisdictions to look inward to justify and/or support their declaration of need. Therefore, the existing approach seems to function as a disincentive cooperation, collaboration, and integration.

This section seeks to demonstrate that consolidating grants with similar goals and objects and administering them to state and local jurisdictions in a block-grant format will greatly reduce competition. Additionally, it is anticipated that this approach will allow jurisdictions to address their unique needs and then begin to look outward in an effort to enhance the overall homeland security enterprise.

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The 2007 *National Strategy for Homeland Security* features an all-hazards approach to national security. Carafano (2008, p. 2) notes localities must sustain independent operations for at least the first 72 hours. This indicates

states/localities must be thoroughly prepared for nearly everything. To address state/local preparedness, DHS leverages control through a series of top-down mandates. For example, a recent mandate caused localities to establish a capability to guard against improvised explosive devices, regardless of their current capacity (U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 1). Such mandates trigger frustration and confusion, as localities feel the federal government is not listening to their concerns, yet continue to force them to spend dollars on vague threats (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, pp. 1–2). However, this coercive approach is not limited to homeland security. The following are examples of other controlling mandates:

- A requirement for states to collect data on sex offenders including DNA samples and to prepare a statewide sex offender registry database (PL 109-299), as a condition attached to receipt of federal law enforcement grants. No appropriations have yet been provided to cover what CBO estimates to be costs of \$60 million over a five-year period.
- Prohibition against using federal grant funds for projects where eminent domain is employed to support private use, a response to the Supreme Court's decision in the Kelo case where the use of eminent domain for such purposes was ruled constitutional.<sup>10</sup> The provision was contained in an FY 2006 appropriations act (PL 109-115) <sup>11</sup>.
- Federal standards requiring state and local governments using federal foster care funds to visit foster care children monthly (PL 109-299).
- Prohibition of state and local lawsuits against manufacturers or sellers of firearms (PL 109-92).
- Institution of a requirement for states to hold special elections when continuity of government is jeopardized by a national emergency, necessitating some states to amend their constitutions (PL 109-55).

- Preemption of state authority governing citing of certain transmission lines, and citing and operation of onshore liquefied natural gas facilities, energy efficiency, safety of nuclear facilities, and the reliability of electric services (PL 109-58). (Posner, 2007, p. 399)

Collectively, these mandates represent an institutionalized approach deemed coercive federalism by Samuel Clovis (2006). This dynamic erodes at the efforts to promote cooperation and collaboration across the various levels of government, as the mandates force states/localities to compete against other jurisdictions for the funding. Additionally, the mandates cause the respective jurisdiction to apply the funding in accordance with the various mandates, thereby potentially neglecting other significant needs.

Nevertheless, states/localities depend on DHS grant funding to offset homeland security spending and, therefore, are compelled to comply with grant requirements in order to receive the funding. As noted, this appears to be a counterproductive strategy and adds to state/local frustrations.

This chapter addresses these frustrations and congressional concerns that grant funding is out of control by exploring the value of consolidating federal grant programs through the use of federal block grants. It is anticipated that doing so will shift primary authority and responsibility to state and locals in an effort to “Facilitate accountability for national goals and objectives” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). This approach is consistent with Sagarin’s (2003) assertion that broad-based thinking must be applied to homeland security. Grant consolidation appears to employ such a broad-based approach and provides the flexibility necessary to address the unique needs of the respective jurisdiction. By allowing state/local governments to address their specific needs, it is expected that security is enhanced from the bottom-up and the overall homeland security enterprise is positively influenced. Furthermore, jurisdictions, when not competing against one another, will likely be more inclined to work together and overcome some of the disconnect noted in the interviews conducted



for this thesis. Consider the comment by a local participant during the interviews for this thesis; “Locals and Feds would be well served to form and enhance the personal relationships between the two groups” (Interviews, 2009).

## **B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

According to a report release by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Presidential directives instruct the DHS to develop a national all-hazards approach—preparing all sectors of society for any emergency event including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters” (2005, p. 2). It is accepted that “First responders have the lead responsibility for carrying out emergency management efforts” (Government Accountability Office, 2005, p. 11). Initially, it was thought the DHS would provide a direct opportunity for localities to engage with the federal government, thus, changing the government’s organizational culture and eliminating many of the prior complications and frustrations (Wortzel, 2003, p. 5). However, after six years, people and organizations continue to merely react to the myriad of homeland security decisions (Bellavita, 2006).

Following September 11, 2001, homeland security dollars went largely to offset existing gaps in first responder capabilities. The DHS funding formulas resulted in disproportionate allocations. For example, “Wyoming received \$10 per capita from DHS for emergency preparedness while New York, much more likely to be a target, received just \$1.40” (O’Hanlon, 2005, p. 3). This problem was somewhat corrected in the 2005 budget by allocating a larger percentage of the funding to high profile cities. However, outside the “Urban Area Security Initiative, (UASI) other funds are still allocated by non-threat based criteria that favor states of low population density” (O’Hanlon, 2005, p. 3).

In these difficult financial times, local agencies are experiencing a growing frustration, as their resources dwindle, while terrorism responsibilities increase. They face continuous cuts in federal funding despite the fact that the majority of Americans believe violent crime is a bigger threat than a potential terrorist attack (Biden, 2008, pp. 1–3). According to Schmitt and Johnston (2008, p. 1):

More openly than at any time since the Sept. 11 attacks, local authorities have begun to complain that the federal financing for domestic security is being too closely tied to combating potential terrorist threats, at a time when they say they have more urgent priorities.

This perpetual drain on resources and the federal government's failure to listen to local concerns is frustrating localities and causing them to be confused about their place in the homeland security enterprise (Schmitt & Johnston, 2008, pp. 1–2).

In the 1980s, crime rates soared. Recognizing crime as a local problem, unique to the respective jurisdiction, the federal government supported localities through federal block-grants/COP funds. According to a 2005 GAO report, these block grants contributed to the decline in crime rates. In addition, President Bush recognized the value of block grants when he proposed, “Converting a wide range of federal programs into block grants” (Finegold, Wherry, & Schardin, 2004, p. 1). Block grants provide a fixed sum of money to a jurisdiction with reduced federal oversight; thus providing the jurisdiction with the flexibility and autonomy to address jurisdiction specific problems.

Despite the success of block-grant programs, the current homeland security funding mechanism does not allow for this style of grant funding. The current approach to homeland security funding allows local governments to offset some of their homeland security costs. As noted in the interview documents, one local (2009) participant said, “The level of preparation far exceeds what it was even a few short years ago. Though not what it should be, progress is being made.” In addition, Gwen Holden (2003) asserts these resources enable local governments to develop advanced levels of preparedness. Some localities indicate federal programs have assisted with “Bringing together multi-disciplinary teams at local, county, and State levels; thereby, improving their all-hazards prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities” (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2009).

However, critics argue despite the successes, the burden and costs of maintaining these efforts ultimately falls back onto the localities (Holden, 2003). This is especially burdensome, as localities are forced to focus on “Maintaining local services” (Interviews, 2009) in addition to their homeland security obligations. This is further compounded by the statutory requirements that dramatically limit the use of funding and slow the availability of grant funds (FEMA, 2009). Additionally, the competing interests of the various stakeholders complicate the grant process and encourage jurisdictions to write harder in their effort to acquire the grant funding (Bellavita, 2008). This arduous process creates “administrative and operational burdens that can defer other state and local preparedness priorities” (FEMA, 2009, p. 22).

Although frustrating, the federal government cautions that the grant funds are not entitlements, as the ultimate goal of the grant program is to integrate local assets into a national preparedness and response system (Carafano, 2006). Many in congress believe it is time for DHS grants to be eliminated and or reduced considerably, as “It is far from clear that the billions spent on homeland security grants since 9/11 has been well spent” (Carafano, 2006, p. 1). Many assert the DHS grants have become *pork barrel* funding, which has contributed little to national security (Carafano, 2006).

However, talk of eliminating the grants may further discourage the integration of local and state assets into the national system, as localities/states will not be able to sustain their assets without federal support. According to Carafano (2006), “Grants should be used to support these missions.” DHS has developed a comprehensive approach to spending in an effort to meet federal priorities and abandoning this process may cause jurisdictions with the highest priorities to lose funding to jurisdictions with lower threat concerns (Carafano, 2006).

Considering these complexities, it is apparent that localities/states “Have unique knowledge of conditions and relationships in their jurisdictions that can significantly add to the planning and accomplishment of preparedness activities”

(FEMA, 2009, p. 19). Therefore, they are best suited to apply funding accordingly, as localities/states are in the best position to address events at the local level. This concept is consistent with Clovis's (2006) discussion of collaborative and competitive federalism. Additionally, localities/states recognize many federal grants are "similar in desired outcomes, [and therefore recommend] . . . consolidation of grants with similar objectives and outcomes" (FEMA, 2009, p. 22). Such consolidation will likely serve to streamline the process and expedite funding directly to the specific problems.

Contrarily, experience suggests localities/states vary significantly, which complicates data collection and accountability. Therefore, some federal involvement is necessary to effectively monitor a consolidated process (Finegold et al., 2004). Also, critics may assert that if left up to the localities/states, the lack of accountability and strict federal oversight will cause a misuse of grant funds and a failure to properly prepare. This thought process supports the concept that homeland security is a national problem to be addressed through a single homeland security definition and hierarchical control. However, the vast majority of the literature is contrary to this position and is further supported by participants' interview feedback, where it is apparent that homeland security is not viewed as linear and hierarchical; instead, it is viewed more as a collaborative effort with input and support from all stakeholders. When asked who is responsible for homeland security, respondents unanimously asserted that homeland security is everyone's responsibility (Interviews, 2009).

### **C. IMPACT**

Considering that "There are some 89,000 jurisdictions below the national level" (Clovis, 2006, p. 11), it is reasonable to expect each locality to have a significant say in addressing homeland security needs unique to the respective jurisdiction. This concept allows homeland security to evolve from the bottom-up as new challenges develop.

The current “Federal grant system for first responders is highly fragmented, which can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). A consolidation of federal grants into block grants provides flexibility to address jurisdiction specific needs, and with properly designed oversight, facilitates efforts in the direction of national goals and objectives. Currently, block grants are used for “Welfare reform, community development, social services, law enforcement, public health, and education” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 11). It is anticipated that block grants, with appropriate oversight, will allocate funding to states/localities with the greatest need and create a balance between accountability and flexibility.

Considering this approach, it is reasonable to expect pushback from some homeland security stakeholders as the impact of this approach transfers responsibility and accountability largely to the state/local level. For example, local government makeup may cause funds to be allocated disproportionately to the various stakeholders. That is, under the block-grant approach, law enforcement may receive funding in lieu of, or at a disproportionate rate, than public health. Additionally, this process potentially causes local politics to become a force in funding allocation, whereas the current system “Generally call[s] for Congress to make a fundamental decision about where power and authority to make decisions should rest in our federal system for a particular program area” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). Another impact consideration centers on the suspicion that localities would use block grants as a “Replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly referred to as *supplantation*” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). This issue is of significant concern because supplantation potentially undermines the integrity of the process and may cause the locality to be underprepared for threats to the homeland. Therefore, a quality oversight process is essential to the success of this endeavor. To address this criticism, a comprehensive oversight committee should be established with representation from all stakeholders. Such a

committee will promote ownership in the process, as well as to ensure allocations are made to the areas of greatest need and in a manner consistent with national goals and objectives. These elements are consistent with several of Mattessich's (2005) success factors, as articulated in Chapter IV.

Furthermore, this oversight mechanism will aid in reducing the problems associated with past block-grant initiatives. According to the General Accounting Office (1982, p. 1), significant oversight concerns developed "Largely because many programs were made accountable to the state rather than the federal level." The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 provides for a federal role in the oversight of block grants. Therefore, the oversight committee should be comprised of all applicable stakeholders, including the required federal representation. It is anticipated that this inclusionary process will provide the necessary guidance, while encouraging collaboration and cooperation among the various stakeholders.

It is apparent that the current process is under great scrutiny from Congress and is frustrating localities. Additionally, because DHS grant goals support the homeland security mission and encourage the integration of local assets into the national system, federal grants are important to the overall process. By establishing a stakeholder committee to provide oversight, conflict is minimized, collaboration is encouraged, and the funding allocation is expedited. Additionally, it is clearly evident that states/localities possess a unique knowledge of their homeland security needs, therefore, allowing these jurisdictions to address their specific needs reasonably translates to a more prepared jurisdiction. Furthermore, the oversight process will ensure the application of the funds is consistent with national goals and objectives, and evolve the overall homeland security enterprise in a positive direction.

#### **D. BLOCK GRANTS AND COLLABORATION**

In addition to the collaborative aspects articulated to this point, Paul Posner (2008) discusses the concept of politics and coercive federalism and its

impact on collaboration. He notes that states/locals are essential to the mandated policy arena, as their cohesiveness for or against the mandates appears to have a considerable influence over the life of the respective mandates. That is, when states/locals bond together, they typically overcome the various coercive mandates, but if there is little or no cohesion, then there is gridlock and frustration over the mandates. He notes the following:

- State political cohesion-federal mandates and other forms of policy centralization will tend to increase if state and local governments are neither united nor effectively mobilized to protect their interests.
- Federal political cohesion-federal mandates will tend to increase to the extent that relevant federal officials are unified and mobilized to advance new national goals.
- Federal-state policy congruence-federal mandates will tend to increase to the extent that leading federal and state leaders are in agreement about the substantive goals behind the mandate.
- Alliances-federal mandates will increase to the extent that state and local governments do not enjoy the support of politically influential interest group or partisan allies. (Posner, 2007, p. 407)

Posner's (2007) research appears to support the significance of homeland security collaboration to achieve desired outcomes, as collaboration is a powerful force against restrictive and burdensome mandates. Additionally, collaboration facilitates innovative approaches to not only address specific jurisdictional needs but also to better integrate state/local assets with national goals and objectives. Posner's findings may not only reflect the value of collaboration in overcoming coercive mandates, it potentially reflects that a lack of collaboration and cohesion may actual invite mandates. In their article "When There is No Calvary," Himberger, Sulek, and Krill (2007, p. 10) note collaboration:

Empowers all actors as full partners with unique strengths to offer, thus capitalizing on the very best ideas, ingenuity, and innovation from across the public, private, and civil sectors—to meet the urgent needs of a global citizenry that arguably faces more frequent and complex disasters than ever before.

Considering the unique needs of the various “actors,” a block-grant approach reduces the competition and promotes cohesion and collaboration, as the actors/stakeholders are then empowered to better prepare. According to Kettl, “Ultimately, the nation’s homeland defense will be only as strong as the links between the national strategy and the ability of state and local governments to support it” (2003, p. 7).

As discussed during the section on enhancing collaborative capacity, efforts must be taken to reduce and/or mitigate disincentives. This section details how the existing DHS grant process serves as a disincentive to the collaborative process, as well as efforts to enhance the overall homeland security enterprise. It was noted previously, that as the nation seeks to build a better future, it must never forget that “The foundation is the most important part” (Kenerson, 2008, p. 40). Empowering state and locals to address their unique needs will serve to bolster such foundation and better prepare the enterprise for sustained growth. In this case, *growth* is intended to reflect enhancements, not more government. This bottom-up decentralized approach appears to be reasonable and consistent with the nation’s federalist principles, as the American system of federalism is based on the allocation of roles and responsibilities for the various levels of government (White House Office, 2006c).

## **E. MOVING FORWARD**

Building upon the foundation established to this point, the next chapter seeks to inject an organizational component to the decentralized approach proposed thus far. This more organized concept focuses on information flow in the complex intelligence community. A specified flow of information within a decentralized environment comprises what was referred to in the introduction as



a hybrid strategy. It is theorized that enhancing the flow of information will encourage better communication and further promote trust across the homeland security enterprise. Additionally, the improvements will serve to facilitate a cyclical flow of information, thereby promoting enterprise learning and situational awareness at all levels of government.

## **VI. ENHANCING INFORMATION FLOW AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

Of the various executive abilities, no one excited more anxious concern than that of placing the interests of our fellow-citizens in the hands of honest men, with understanding sufficient for their stations

Thomas Jefferson, 1743–1826

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

The thesis interviews identified significant concerns across government with regards to information/intelligence sharing between levels of government. One local executive noted, “We hope we are getting the appropriate information to best serve the greater good” (Interviews, 2009). A federal executive wrote that he was significantly concerned about “Inappropriate dissemination of non confirmed information that may provide disinformation in the overall scheme of the event” (Interviews, 2009). These statements not only draw attention to the need to enhance information sharing, they reflect a desire and need to have overall situational awareness. To improve situational awareness, it is apparent that information/intelligence must flow freely in a vertical and horizontal manner, thereby promoting situational awareness for all stakeholders.

However, at the macro level, intelligence is fragmented across the federal government. This fragmentation makes it difficult to direct/move intelligence to the proper location, and it makes it difficult to truly gain and/or provide situational awareness (Jackson, 2008). Therefore, steps must be taken to enhance intelligence sharing among the various levels of government. Unlike the decentralized approach of previous chapters, this section incorporates structure as a means to effectively move intelligence across the enterprise.

In an effort to address this enterprise-wide problem, this chapter builds upon the existing intelligence community and draws from success factors

discovered in an analysis of Australia's Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). It is believed that enhancing the U.S. intelligence community involves consolidation of the fragmented components, enhanced community outreach, and comprehensive oversight. Collectively, it is theorized that these elements facilitate the free-flow of intelligence vertically and horizontally across the community enhancing communication, thereby promoting trust, which is essential for building collaborative capacity. In addition, it is anticipated that these reform measures will facilitate situational awareness at each of the respective levels of government consistent with the principles of federalism.

## **B. HISTORY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM**

September 11, 2001, compelled change in the United State's intelligence world. Intelligence resources were forced to migrate from a focus primarily on state-sponsored terrorism to the complexities associated with individuals, small groups, asymmetry, unconventional tactics, and transnational threats. This transition required the U.S. to change its philosophy about foreign verses domestic intelligence (Burch, 2007). Despite the evolution, Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor asserts, "The safest place in the world for a terrorist to be is inside the United States. . . . As long as terrorists do not do something that trips them up against our laws, they can do pretty much all they want" (Burch, 2007, p. 1).

Scowcroft's assertion is bold and raises the question, how can this be possible? In an effort to analyze the underlying complexities and identify the problems that give rise to an apparent sanctuary for terrorist, the reader must first understand the issues of domestic intelligence in the U.S. According to Burch (2007, p. 1), "The area of domestic intelligence raises several issues. First, law enforcement and intelligence operate in different worlds—one seeks to prosecute, the other to gather information." Additionally, the development of intelligence focused state fusion centers and other organizations result in more

bureaucracy and less information sharing (Burch, 2007). These complexities cause concern with the protection of “civil liberties and effective oversight” (Burch, 2007, p. 1).

In addition to the issues identified by Burch, the ultimate responsibility of intelligence rests with the FBI. The FBI’s mission is:

To protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009, p. 1)

This enormous worldwide responsibility is tasked to a relatively small group of sworn personnel. According to Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey (2008, p. 5):

As the primary investigative agency of the federal government, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has the authority and responsibility to investigate all violations of federal law that are not exclusively assigned to another federal agency. The FBI is further vested by law and by Presidential directives with the primary role in carrying out investigations within the United States of threats to the national security. This includes the lead domestic role in investigating international terrorist threats to the United States, and in conducting counterintelligence activities to meet foreign entities’ espionage and intelligence efforts directed against the United States. The FBI is also vested with important functions in collecting foreign intelligence as a member agency of the U.S. Intelligence Community. . . . These roles reflect the wide range of the FBI’s current responsibilities and obligations, which require the FBI to be both an agency that effectively detects, investigates, and prevents crimes, and an agency that effectively protects the national security and collects intelligence.

These myriad responsibilities make it difficult for the FBI to be experts at any single task, especially one of such importance as domestic intelligence. Previous Congressional inquiries identified three specific shortcomings that highlight the need for improvements:

- The FBI's decentralized structure and inadequate information technology made the Bureau unable to correlate the knowledge possessed by its components. The FBI did not gather intelligence from all its many cases nation-wide to produce an overall assessment of al Qaeda's presence in the United States.
- Many FBI field offices had not made counterterrorism a top priority and they knew little about al Qaeda before September 11.
- The FBI also did not inform policymakers of the extent of terrorist activity in the United States. "Although the FBI conducted many investigations, these pieces were not fitted into a larger picture. (Burch, 2007, p. 2)

Despite the significant intelligence role of the FBI, the responsibilities for domestic intelligence remains fragmented across the federal government. For example, the Department of Homeland Security "Has primary responsibility for protecting and deterring against terrorist attacks; and the NCTC [National Counter-Terrorism Center] has primary responsibility for coordinating information-sharing and integrating foreign intelligence into the system" (Jackson, 2009, p. 81). Expanding from these core agencies is a complex web of agencies focused on moving intelligence data throughout the country; many of which experience information gaps and fail to effectively communicate (Jackson, 2009).

This compilation of issues sparked government initiatives and considerable FBI reform. However, these efforts resulted in minimal improvements and an ongoing intelligence gap, as the FBI remains tasked with multiple responsibilities but lacks appropriate resources and structure. This ongoing problem surfaced during the interviews conducted for this study, when one local participant noted, "We hope we are getting the appropriate information to best serve the greater good;" and a state participant noted, "I also have concerns about the information-sharing dynamic" (Interviews, 2009). To address these concerns, it is suggested that more comprehensive reform of the overall intelligence enterprise is needed. This effort must focus on creating an environment within the FBI that allows it to appropriately meet its many demands. These changes must consider public support and oversight, which will serve to

enhance the FBI's ability to perform its many functions and address the frustrations and lack of trust across the levels of government.

An examination of existing domestic intelligence successes offers insight into potential improvements for U.S. domestic intelligence efforts. It is anticipated that such improvements will not only enhance the FBI's intelligence capabilities, but it will also demonstrate the U.S.'s commitment to protecting the nation from another major attack. Additionally, reform efforts will likely provide clarity, which will assist in reducing the competition and confusion between the law enforcement and intelligence communities. By doing so, the FBI will be better suited to develop the terrorist nexus from a prevention standpoint (Burch, 2007).

Mark M. Lowenthal (2006, p. 246) notes legislation continues to expand the FBI's authority "In the gray areas between foreign and domestic intelligence and between intelligence and law enforcement." Currently, the FBI's many tasks and competing responsibilities result in confusion and force the men and women of the FBI to try to be all things to all people. It is time to revise the intelligence enterprise and create an environment within the FBI that provides clarity for the "gray" areas and allows the FBI to effectively meet the demands of being the nation's primary federal law enforcement agency.

### **C. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE IN AUSTRALIA**

In an effort to enhance domestic intelligence in the U.S., it is appropriate to examine the successes and challenges of similar efforts. Although less complex and much smaller, Australia's intelligence community offers clear concise components that appear to contribute directly to its success. For these reasons, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) was selected for this study, as it offers insight into specific success factors that may be applicable and aid in enhancing the U.S. intelligence community.

According to the ASIO 2007–2008 Year in Review, the terrorist threat in Australia continues to grow. Much like the U.S., the greatest threat is found in

the Middle East and South Asia. Additionally, the ASIO reports, “There are other threats to Australia’s security beyond terrorism. Australia’s economic strength, technological development, and strong global partnerships make it a continuing target for espionage and foreign interference” (ASIO Report to Parliament, 2008, p. 1). These threat complexities and challenges have similarities to the threat environment in the U.S.; both the FBI and the ASIO are under considerable pressure to prevent terrorist attacks.

The ASIO is comprised of 1,492 employees with a targeted growth of 1,860 by 2010–2011. The organization is committed to training, and has invested 6.4 million dollars into its *Learning and Development Strategy* to enhance its overall capabilities. This investment includes capabilities in advanced analysis, complex data exploitation, and enhanced operational analysis (ASIO, 2008). The ASIO has furthered developed its partnerships, both domestically and abroad; and expanded its officer attachment to various agencies. This effort improved understanding of the organization’s role and encouraged information sharing across disciplines. The ASIO distributes intelligence multiple stakeholders including government ministries, law enforcement, policy makers, intelligence agencies, and states (ASIO Report to Parliament, 2008). The organization attributes its success to “Rigorous internal and external accountability and oversight arrangements . . . [as well as, strong] operational policies to ensure they remained relevant and continue to provide clear guidance to officers” (ASIO Report to Parliament, 2008, p. 3).

While there are many agencies collecting intelligence, the ASIO has the primary role to conduct “Intelligence investigations into terrorist threats to Australia” (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2008, p. 13). The police investigate criminal matters and generate intelligence that aids in terrorism prosecutions. The ASIO and police share relative information and the ASIO functions as the primary link between government agencies and other intelligence partners (National Counter-Terrorism Committee, 2008).

According to Ms. Margaret Hurley (2009) (Australia's Senior Liaison Officer in Washington, DC), the ASIO was established in 1949 and has evolved overtime to meet the nation's growing threat of terrorism. The ASIO has no executive or arrest powers; therefore, it is not bound by the traditional rules of evidence applicable to criminal prosecutions. The organization collects secret intelligence related to foreign and domestic threats. Because the ASIO lacks arrest powers, it enjoys tremendous latitude with special powers to collect intelligence; these include:

- The ability to establish wire/telecommunication intercepts
- The ability to deploy listening and tracking devices
- The ability to conduct covert and/or overt searches
- The ability to gain access to and search computers
- The ability to inspect and/or examine postal materials
- The ability to question and/or detain individuals of a terrorism interest. (Hurley, 2009)

According to Australian's Prime Minister John Howard, "In the difficult fight against the new menace of international terrorism, there is nothing more crucial than timely and accurate intelligence" (Anslet, 2003, p. 1). This emphasis on terrorism contributes greatly to the success of the ASIO, as the organization enjoys comprehensive governmental support.

Organizationally, the ASIO and the Australian Protective Service (APS) are detailed to Australia's Attorney General. The ASIO is a by-product of a nation heavily influenced by the "British philosophy of separating domestic intelligence and law enforcement powers" (Burch, 2007, p. 9). The ASIO works closely with the APS, which is similar to the FBI. These organizations, along with state organizations, collaborate through the National Threat Assessment Center (Burch, 2007).

While Australia has not experienced the same terrorist threat as the United Kingdom and U.S., the ASIO is recognized as being successful in



categorizing and tracking domestic terrorist threats. The organization enjoys a positive reputation for its preciseness and thoroughness.

On November 18, 2005, Australian authorities foiled the activities of two terrorist cells. ASIO and Australian law enforcement agencies were able to prevent an attack possibly aimed at critical infrastructure as a result of an eighteen-month long investigation into individuals with possible linkages to al Qaeda and radical Kashmiri groups. Burch, 2007, p. 9)

In addition to the ASIO's investigative responsibilities, the organization provides input to the Office of National Assessment (ONA), which formulates the nation's strategy. Oversight for the ASIO is grounded in the organization's statutory responsibilities: ASIO Act of 1979, and the *Intelligence Services Act of 2001*. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security oversees Australia's intelligence enterprise (Burch, 2009). This is a robust oversight process as "The Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) is an independent officer appointed by the Governor-General and located within the Prime Minister's office" (Burch, 2007, p. 10). This structure affords the IGIS the ability not only to work jointly with parliament on oversight issues but also to function independently, as the IGIS has access to warrant powers, case files, and financial records.

As an added safeguard, Australia relies heavily on public feedback. The National Security Public Information Guidelines promote public understanding of the organization's mission, as well as the threat to the nation. According to Burch (2007), these guidelines directly correlate with ASIO's efforts to engage the citizens and establish communication portals within the various communities.

Although the ASIO has been very successful, critics argue their tactics have been intrusive and heavy handed. According to Natalie O'Brian (2008), a reporter for *The Australian*, the ASIO and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have a strained relationship due to poor communication and mistrust. O'Brian asserts this is largely based on inadequate information sharing. However, a commissioned review, *The Street Inquiry*, resulted in ten recommendations for

improving relations. According to the AFP, it is working closely with the ASIO to make improvements (O'Brian, 2008), which represents proactive steps to enhance communication and intelligence sharing.

Overall, the ASIO's handling of criticism and its willingness to make improvements is a strength. Additional strengths exist in Australia's "Strong laws governing domestic intelligence, the ability of the executive body to coordinate intelligence, and its independent assessment capability" (Burch, 2007, p. 11).

#### **D. THE ENVIRONMENTS**

According to Brian Jackson (2008) of the RAND Corporation, the U.S. faces a greater threat from domestic and imported terrorism than does Australia. However, he notes Australia's risk has greatly increased because of actions by former Prime Minister John Howard. Prime Minister Howard's close alliance with the U.S. and his decision to host major international events magnified his nation's risk. These major events included the 2000 Olympics, the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, and the 1999–2000 International Force for East Timor intervention. (*This event generated considerable opposition across Indonesia and the wider Muslim world*). Additionally, international agreements and globalization increased border movements of money, people, and goods. This environment "Rendered redundant the traditional defense afforded to the country [Australia] by its geography" (Jackson, 2008, p. 37).

Australia's main security concerns center on internal and external threats from Islamist extremists associated with al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, an Indonesian based group credited with the 2002 Bali Bombings (Sherlock, 2002). Prior to the 2002 bombings, many in Australia had considered the nation insulated from terrorism, but the targeting of Australians in the Bali Bombings demonstrated potential vulnerabilities and false perceptions. Prior to the 2002 Bali bombing, "The last serious incident on Australian soil was the bombing of the Sydney Hilton Hotel in 1978 in which three people died" (Hughes, 2002). The U.S. asserts the Bali attacks were the work of al Qaeda, but Australia's position

is “Only that the bombings were clearly a terrorist attack (Sherlock, 2002, p. 1). In addition to the external threat, Australia is concerned with radicalization within its borders, as well has homegrown cell ties with al Qaeda and like affiliates (Jackson, 2008).

Similarly, the U.S. struggles with many of the same threats and both nations are under pressure to prevent attacks. It is anticipated the U.S. will endure an evolving threat from Islamic terrorist groups associated with al Qaeda. According to the National Intelligence Council (2007), U.S. efforts have diminished the probability of al Qaeda to strike the homeland, as the U.S. is perceived to be a hardened target. However, of great concern is waning support from world partners. The National Intelligence Council (2007, p. 6) reports that al Qaeda “Will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.”

Like Australia, the U.S. is concerned with radicalization within its borders (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The National Intelligence Council (2007) asserts the U.S. is in a heightened threat environment and will likely remain, as al Qaeda continues to enhance its ability to attack the homeland and put operatives in the U.S. The specific threat extends to prominent targets with the goal of mass casualties. Tactics include the use of small arms and improvised explosives; and an ongoing effort to acquire and use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material. Additionally, “We assess that other, non-Muslim terrorist groups—often referred to as ‘single-issue’ groups by the FBI—probably will conduct attacks over the next three years given their violent histories” (National Intelligence Council, 2007, p.7).

As is the case in Australia, U.S. globalization has contributed to the increased threat. Technological advances facilitate communication, where it once failed to exist, which allows small, otherwise alienated groups to collaborate

and conspire. The U.S. must be prepared for broader and more diverse terrorist activity, as it continues to be viewed as the target of choice for terrorists (National Intelligence Council, 2007).

Like the U.S., the Australian government is very serious and committed to fighting terrorism. It recognizes the importance of international and internal cooperation and coordination. Both governments emphasize counter-terrorism strategies based on *prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery*. The ASIO is an integral part of this effort, as its primary focus is prevention. The ASIO enjoys a reputation of being precise and diligent in their efforts to develop intelligence for this purpose (Burch, 2007).

The ASIO grew from the Commonwealth Investigation Service. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization Act of 1979 provides the ASIO's statutory authority for operation. Of significance, is the organization's lack of arrest powers, as it allows the ASIO to incorporate more intrusive tactics of intelligence collection. This arrangement is contrary to the U.S. where the FBI collects intelligence and makes arrests. The ASIO reports it is interested, "Solely with collecting and analyzing information on threats to the country's internal security" (Jackson, 2008, p. 39).

The ASIO functions in a strict oversight environment, where there is distinction between executive and legislative oversight. The 2001 Intelligence Services Act enhanced the role of Parliament's Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The committee is tasked with overseeing Australia's intelligence enterprise. This committee initiates investigations and/or responds to Attorney General Requests about the nation's intelligence functions. In addition to the committee's oversight is the previously discussed role of the IGIS. This comprehensive oversight mechanism ensures the ASIO operates within its scope of authority. The ASIO is subject to well-defined and articulated legislation that limits its authority and establishes its place in the larger Australian Intelligence Community (Jackson, 2008). This aggressive oversight structure serves to

provide checks and balances to the ASIO to facilitate a comprehensive intelligence network, as well as providing for situational awareness (Burch, 2007).

In contrast, the U.S., without a domestic intelligence agency, relies on the multi-tasked FBI for this function. The FBI serves as the primary federal investigating/law enforcement agency and the lead domestic agency for collecting intelligence. The FBI derives its authority from executive orders, from delegations by the Attorney General, and from statutory provisions, such as, *50 U.S.C. 401 et seq. and 50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.* (Mukasey, 2008). Additionally, the U.S. Constitution limits government's scope of authority with regards to search and seizure and it guarantees due process for citizens. Unlike Australia, the FBI is forced to function within this restrictive environment, which further complicates intelligence collection and prohibits more intrusive tactics, absent judicial review (Joint Commission on Printing, 2006). Executive orders and legislation have expanded government's authority in some circumstances, such as those articulated in the U.S. Patriot Act (2001); however, the U.S.'s intelligence collection authority still remains more restrictive than that of Australia. These complexities demonstrate the need to establish/promote a sense of order within this complex environment, thus, facilitating extensive cooperation among the myriad of stakeholders.

Moreover, legislative and administrative reforms since 2001 have focused on enhancing the FBI's intelligence analysis capabilities independent of its other responsibilities. However, reform success has been minimal, as the intelligence community remains fragmented, and the FBI lacks the appropriate resources to handle the monumental task of domestic intelligence.

Furthermore, the U.S. approaches intelligence opposite from Australia; that is, the U.S. government subscribes to the philosophy of consolidation and pooling of resources. Unfortunately, the organization to facilitate this concept

appears to be severely lacking. The desire to consolidate is evident in the below excerpt from *The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations* (Mukasey, 2008, p. 10):

A smart government would *integrate* all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole. Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intelligence. . . . The importance of integrated, all-source analysis cannot be overstated. Without it, it is not possible to connect the dots.

Like Australia, the U.S. oversight is a significant component of the intelligence enterprise. Laws, regulations, and policies define the FBI's authority. These include an emphasis on protecting privacy and civil liberties in a manner consistent with the nation's federalist principles. However, oversight is a shared responsibility among the following:

- The Justice Department's National Security Division
- The FBI's Inspection Division
- The Office of General Counsel
- The Office of Integrity and Compliance
- The National Security Division's Oversight Section (Mukasey, 2008)

Also, oversight is found in requirements that the FBI notify the National Security Division of investigations involving foreign intelligence collection or investigation of U.S. citizens for matters related to national security threats. Additionally, the FBI must produce annual reports regarding their foreign intelligence collection and allow access “By the National Security Division to information obtained by the FBI through national security or foreign intelligence activities and general authority for the Assistant Attorney General for National Security to obtain reports from the FBI concerning these activities” (Mukasey, 2008, p. 11). The many oversight components in the U.S. system appear to be fragmented and not as clearly structured as the Australian system. In addition, the fact that each U.S. state has its own unique legal system contributes to these challenges.

## **E. FINDINGS**

As a result of this study, it is apparent that the complexities and diversity of the U.S. intelligence environment demand change. As one federal participant noted, the nation must address “Appropriate dissemination and [work] within appropriate laws and regulations concerning the dissemination of the information.” The successes of ASIO seem to indicate a U.S. domestic intelligence agency may be a feasible solution. However, there are many significant challenges to domestic intelligence in the U.S. Current laws, policies, and political complexities cause significant obstacles for a U.S. Domestic Intelligence Agency. Additionally, it is recognized “That simply having a domestic intelligence service is no panacea for eliminating domestic threats” (Jackson, 2008, p. 18).

Although many countries have experienced success with a domestic intelligence agency, expanding the nation’s large bureaucracy will likely make it more difficult to establish trustful relationships with the 18,000 plus law enforcement organizations that protect the 89,000 state and local jurisdictions (Clovis, 2006; IACP, 2008). Therefore, it appears more logical to build upon the nation’s existing intelligence community by incorporating applicable success factors of others.

### **1. The FBI**

Existing laws and structures cause the FBI to be the most logical agency to coordinate domestic intelligence activities. According to one FBI supervisor (Anonymous, 2009), the “FBI is tasked with law enforcement and intelligence functions, which are not mutually inclusive.” However, he indicates former Attorney General Mukasey established new guidelines to clarify both missions. Accordingly, the FBI supervisor argues there is no current organization with the resources or infrastructure to effectively manage U.S. domestic intelligence. He asserts the FBI routinely collects and analyzes intelligence with the thought of an eventual criminal prosecution, which often involves charges of something other

than terror-related statutes. When discussing a U.S. Domestic Intelligence agency, he cites the following problematic example, “When we receive information from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] it most often can never be used in court due to methods and means of collection; they [CIA] operate outside the U.S. Constitution” (Anonymous, 2009).

Despite the FBI’s understanding of the legal system and their willingness to embrace additional responsibilities, the challenge of inadequate resources continues to plague the organization. The FBI is involved in law enforcement and intelligence operations around the world with tremendous expectations of success.

To address these challenges, it is believed that improvements to the existing intelligence enterprise are gained by consolidating U.S. intelligence functions within the FBI. However, it is suggested that intelligence functions be separated from the FBI’s law enforcement duties to prevent the perception of impropriety or the expansion of Lowenthal’s (2006) “gray area.” To enhance this capability, it is recommended that this endeavor include two critical ASIO success factors: a strong centralized oversight mechanism and an active public outreach program.

- *Oversight:* Currently, U.S. intelligence oversight is shared and fragmented across the federal government. It is recommended this responsibility be consolidated and modeled after ASIO’s oversight structure. Following this approach, a U.S. Congressional Committee (Bipartisan) should be established to function in an oversight capacity, much like Parliament’s Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Additionally, the role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should be restructured in a manner similar to that of the IGIS. It is anticipated that these changes will strengthen U.S. intelligence oversight by clearly delineating responsibility and authority. Comprehensive oversight will promote professionalism and reduce suspicions of inappropriate conduct.
- *Public Outreach:* While a strong oversight mechanism encourages trust, professionalism, it is further recognized that new communication portals will develop from an enhanced public



outreach program. This component promotes public/private collaboration and serves reduce suspicion. Because of the success of Australia's National Security Public Information Guidelines, a similar endeavor is recommended for the U.S. It is anticipated that a comprehensive program aimed at educating the public and eliciting support will promote trust and aid in engaging communities in the nation's intelligence mission.

In addition to improved oversight and public outreach, additional human resources are required. As articulated in this section, the FBI is heavily tasked and understaffed; they embrace their global responsibilities with a mere 31,676 employees, of which, 12,977 are sworn special agents (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009). By consolidating U.S. domestic intelligence within the FBI, intelligence functions will no longer be tasked to multiple government agencies. Therefore, these positions can be reallocated to the FBI in an effort to provide the necessary support to appropriately manage consolidated intelligence functions. While some additional positions may be needed, this reallocation will drastically reduce the costs associated with adding resources to the FBI.

It is anticipated that these enhancements will provide a comprehensive framework to truly understand the nature of the terrorist threat and provide the situational awareness necessary to support the nation's prevention efforts. Accordingly, the distinct benefits are as follows:

- Prosecutorial decisions are based upon comprehensive criminal investigations conducted by professional law enforcement. Intelligence investigations are performed by professionals who understand the legal system and how investigations migrate from intelligence to criminal.
- Strict oversight promotes integrity and professionalism, and it limits the scope of authority and offers protection for civil liberties consistent with U.S. federalist principles.
- Intelligence is consolidated to gain true situational awareness at all levels of government.
- Jackson (2008) asserts intelligence is primarily a prevention strategy. He argues the separation of law enforcement and

intelligence functions promotes a *culture of prevention*. In support of Jackson's argument, intelligence and law enforcement will be separate functions within the FBI.

- Coupled with a strong community outreach program, citizen pushback will be limited and outreach efforts will likely enhance community involvement.
- A consolidated intelligence effort will assist in clarifying roles and responsibilities, which is likely to facilitate communication across the intelligence enterprise.
- The costs associated with this recommendation are minimal, but the benefits are enormous.

The recommendations set forth in this section are not intended to reflect a command and control structure, where the FBI issues orders to states, as this would be counterproductive to efforts to enhance collaborative capacity. Instead, these recommendations seek to clarify roles and allocate responsibilities across government in a manner consistent with the American system of federalism (White House Office, 2006c).

## **2. Reform in Action**

As an example, intelligence comes to the attention of a local official. That official pushes the intelligence to the appropriate state fusion center, which serves as the state's central repository. The state fusion center then pushes the intelligence to the FBI's Intelligence Section (Single Federal Repository). This upward flow of intelligence facilitates situational awareness at each level of government. Using this same flow, the FBI will have 50 points of contact (fusion centers) when pushing information downward. This streamlines the flow and allows states to maintain situational awareness without being bypassed in the process.

Like the vertical flow of information, the horizontal flow is better facilitated, as each level of government is involved in the free flow of intelligence. Under this reformed concept, the federal repository deals with states, not localities—

states coordinate with localities. This is consistent with role allocation under the concepts of federalism, as noted in the report, *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*. In this report, it was noted that the American system of federalism depends upon “Allocating roles and responsibilities between levels of government by utilizing a layered system that requires local governments to first request assistance from their State. States, in turn, must use their own resources, if available, before requesting Federal assistance” (White House Office, 2006c, p. 72). While this document refers to the response component, its principles are applicable to the overall coordination of our layered system of government.

It is clear that these recommendations do not comprise the end-all solution that will prevent another attack, but they can serve to enhance information sharing and provide greater situational awareness.

### **3. Moving Forward**

This study has identified many complexities and concerns of the homeland security enterprise. Primary concerns reflect an overall lack of trust and collaboration. To address these challenges, recommendations focused on approaches to enhance collaborative capacity by building upon small trustful relationships. This process is further facilitated by consolidating the many DHS grants and then decentralizing the overall allocation of the monies to allow states and localities to first address their jurisdictional specific needs. It is anticipated that this decentralized approach will encourage enterprise-wide trust, thereby enhancing collaborative capacity. This particular section, introduced an element of organization to the overall strategy by consolidating intelligence functions in the FBI, reallocating positions from the fragmented intelligence community, establishing comprehensive oversight, and developing a public outreach program. This more structured component rounds out the hybrid strategy for enhancing the homeland security enterprise. It is believed that this overarching strategy better prepares the nation for future challenges.

The final chapter of this study seeks to pull together each of the previous components and provide an understanding of how this hybrid strategy helps the myriad of stakeholders understand just where they fit in the homeland security enterprise.

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## **VII. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER**

To look up and not down, To look forward and not back, To look out  
and not in, and To lend a hand.

Nathan H. Dole (1852–1935)

### **A. OVERVIEW**

As noted throughout this study, and supported by the study's interviews, protecting the American people must be a shared responsibility across levels of governments and the various disciplines that make up the homeland security enterprise. Therefore, if the value of collaboration is so clear, why is it often so difficult? It seems organizational cultures, demands on resources, and varying motivations result in barriers that interfere and/or discourage cooperation and collaboration (Temple, 2007, pp. 20–28).

These influences on collaboration highlight the interconnectivity and interdependency of the homeland security enterprise. Additionally, the intangibles of culture and varying motivations, combined with an all-hazards approach to national security, result in what Bellavita's (2006) "Bubbling swamp of intended and unintended consequences." That is, the homeland security enterprise appears to be imploding from turf battles, suspicion, poor communication, competitive funding, and mistrust. The interviews (2009) conducted as part of this thesis revealed the following examples:

- Concerned about potential inactivity of federal agencies. Uncertain about federal agency cooperation with locals. It is apparent that many federal agencies are inefficient, have communication issues, and often times do not play well with each other.
- Concern of open lane of communication. We hope we are getting the appropriate information to best serve the greater good.
- Locals and Feds would be well served to form and enhance the personal relationships.

- At this early stage, my concern is other stakeholders may not take the threat seriously.
- Additionally, I would be concerned local agencies would resist the immediate assistance being offered by the state and federal agencies.
- Some of the players may feel the need to control the information shared among the agencies working to mitigate this threat. This is counterproductive.

In an effort to thoroughly examine these complex issues, this thesis explored three key areas of literature; the definition of homeland security, federalism, and collaborative capacity. The reader may ask, why this literature?

First, in order to formulate an improved strategy for the future, one must understand the strategy's purpose, goals, and objectives. The literature reflects homeland security is in one sense a single definition, which needs to be addressed with a command and control approach. In another sense, homeland security is situational and means something different to the various stakeholders. While this research cannot offer a definitive position on this subject, it does reflect an evolving future (*one of learning and growth*) and a tendency toward the situational definition of homeland security. Interview participants (2009) consistently focused their attention on the public and the fact that "Locals will still be responsible for local issues." This seems to support the less rigid definition.

Second, the nation's governance is grounded in the principles of federalism and shared governance. Therefore, any strategy must incorporate these principles to promote ownership and buy-in from the various stakeholders. As one local (2009) interviewee noted, "[Homeland security is the] responsibility of all of government regardless of affiliation. Each group has priorities and obligations." This shared approach indicates that the principles of federalism delineate specific roles and responsibilities to the various groups or levels of government. This concept was further expanded upon by a state (2009) representative who commented, "I say this because the perspective, priorities,

and focus are different at every layer. This is useful to the overall effort of promoting homeland security because no single layer can focus on everything at once.” These comments reflect the significance of the nation’s federalist principles and further support a situational and collaborative approach to homeland security.

Third, the literature surrounding collaborative capacity reflects that all homeland security stakeholders must work together as, future challenges are too much for any single institution or jurisdiction (Klitgaard & Treverton, 2003). A state participant noted:

Homeland security is the responsibility of all of the entities . . . Funding has caused turf wars among agencies. A cookie cutter approach was utilized by DHS in the appropriation of grant funds. What works in Wyoming may not necessarily work in Virginia. (Interviews, 2009)

Not only does this statement draw attention to a collaborative approach, it notes disincentives caused by the existing competitive DHS grant programs.

Collectively, an analysis of the literature, participant feedback, and related reports, led to comprehensive recommendations for enhancing collaborative capacity, reorganizing the DHS grant programs, and reforming U.S. intelligence with the goal to enhance cooperation and collaboration in the unique and complex world of homeland security. As noted in the argument and supported by this research, the solution appears to lie in a hybrid strategy where some aspects are structured and others are decentralized, thereby creating the synergy that will evolve enterprise learning in a manner that better prepares the nature for the uncertainties of the future.

## **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In the document addressing lessons learned from Katrina, it was noted that “There is uneven coordination . . . among State and local governments. For example, our States and territories developed fifty-six unique homeland security



strategies, as have fifty high-threat, high-density urban areas” (White House Office. 2006c, p. 67). This statement reflects the complexities and fragmentation at a macro level and draw attention to the need for a common ideology to help homeland security stakeholders all understand their place the homeland security enterprise. Given the body of research, Table 3 is utilized to illustrate the strategic areas to be addressed in order to advance the positives and minimize the negatives.

Table 3. Eliminate-Reduce-Raise-Create Grid  
(from Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, p. 36)

<p><b>Eliminate</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coercive Grant Funding</li> <li>• Multiple intelligence agencies</li> </ul>	<p><b>Raise</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collaborative Capacity</li> <li>• Information Sharing</li> <li>• Situational Awareness</li> </ul>
<p><b>Reduce</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Competition</li> <li>• Enterprise Fragmentation</li> <li>• Duplication of roles and responsibilities</li> </ul>	<p><b>Create</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A Culture of Collaboration</li> <li>• DHS Block-grant Funding</li> <li>• Centralized Intelligence</li> </ul>

Despite all we do, however, Hurricane Katrina was a deadly reminder that we can and must do better, and we will. This is the first and foremost lesson we learned from the death and devastation caused by our country's most destructive natural disaster: No matter how prepared we think we are, we must work every day to improve. (White House Office, 2006c, p. 1)

## **1. Collaborative Capacity**

The research clearly supports a bottom-up approach based on small relationships or circles that evolve from trust and leadership. To build capacity, an ideology must be established based on the homeland security mission “To lead the unified national effort to secure the country and preserve our freedoms” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 2). Leadership, in the form of a catalyst with no coercive power, encourages and inspires stakeholders to expand their smaller groups. As these trustful relationships grow their existing capacity for conflict resolution is espoused, thus, positively influencing the larger collaboration. However, the myriad of stakeholders must remain flexible and patient because building collaborative capacity is largely contingent upon trust, which develops when words and actions are consistent.

As these new relationships form, emphasis should be on seeking new members to add value to the relationship, and the overall focus must remain on the synergy of the group, not the individual members. Collaboration is an empowering environment, and when they are empowered “People are most likely to take risks, experience success, and then feel empowered themselves” (Quinn, 1996, p. 228). Supporting the collaboration with multiple champions, who embrace conflict will minimize threats and maximize creativity and evolution.

## **2. Block Grants**

The author acknowledges building collaborative capacity in a complex environment is challenging. Therefore, efforts must focus on minimizing the obstacles, such as the existing challenges found in the competitive funding environment of DHS grants.

The current “Federal grant system for first responders is highly fragmented, which can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels” (Government Accountability Office, 2003, p. 2). Considering this complexity, it is reasonable to surmise that improvements to the

federal grant system will aid in creating an environment more conducive of cooperation and collaboration. To address this apparent disincentive to collaboration, this study proposed consolidating all federal grants with similar goals and objectives into a single block grant. Through collective oversight, the funding is allocated to address jurisdictional specific needs in a manner consistent with the nation's homeland security's goals and objectives. As with the collaborative capacity discussion, the establishment of national goals and objectives should be a collaborative process. It is believed that these recommendations will further encourage stakeholder collaboration, which:

Empowers all actors as full partners with unique strengths to offer, thus capitalizing on the very best ideas, ingenuity, and innovation from across the public, private, and civil sectors—to meet the urgent needs of a global citizenry that arguably faces more frequent and complex disasters than ever before. (Himberger, Sulek, & Krill, 2007, p. 10)

As noted by Donald Kettl (2003, p. 7), “Ultimately, the nation's homeland defense will be only as strong as the links between the national strategy and the ability of state and local governments to support it.” The consolidation of federal grants appears to be a way to strengthen the link.

### **3. Intelligence Reform**

Another obstacle to collaborative capacity was identified in the highly fragmented intelligence community. This particular component of the research involved an analysis of the handling of intelligence in Australia and the U.S. Contrary to the research surrounding collaboration and block grants, it is believed a more structured approach will facilitate effective intelligence sharing and promote situational awareness across the homeland security enterprise. This research supports consolidating U.S. intelligence functions within the FBI. However, separate intelligence and law enforcement functions to prevent the perception of impropriety or a spill over into Lowenthal's (2006) “gray area.” This

reform includes two ASIO success factors: a strong centralized oversight mechanism and an active public outreach program.

Currently, U.S. intelligence oversight is shared and fragmented across the federal government. The research supports consolidating oversight by forming a U.S. Congressional Committee (Bipartisan) to function similarly to Parliament's Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. Additionally, expand the role of the Director of National Intelligence to model that of the IGIS. It is anticipated that these changes will strengthen U.S. intelligence oversight by clearly delineating responsibility and authority. Strong centralized oversight will promote professionalism and reduce suspicions of inappropriate conduct.

It is apparent that strong oversight promotes professionalism in the intelligence community, and builds confidence and support from the public. To further encourage public trust, it is recommended that the U.S. incorporate a program similar to that of Australia's public outreach. This new program should be a comprehensive effort aimed at educating the public and building trust in government.

In addition to improved oversight and public outreach, additional human resources are required, as the FBI is heavily tasked and understaffed. As articulated in Chapter VI, the consolidation of intelligence functions allows the FBI to gain additional resources without depleting other government agencies. This approach minimizes cost, while simultaneously addressing staffing issues. It is anticipated that this reform will provide the comprehensive structure necessary to fully understand the nature of the terrorist threat and provide the situational awareness at all levels of government. A consolidated intelligence community provides clarification of roles and responsibilities; it facilitates situational awareness; it facilitates communication; it reduces fragmentation; and it streamlines the flow of information.

### **C. AREAS OF ADDITIONAL RESEARCH**

The issues discussed in this thesis are vast and influenced by many variables. It is apparent that any one of the categories could have been expanded upon and examined as its own thesis topic. However, the focus of this research was to identify existing gaps in the overall homeland security enterprise and make recommendations to minimize the negatives and enhance the positives. As a result, this study draws attention to several areas for additional research:

- Consolidating federal grant programs will result in huge monetary allocations to the various homeland security stakeholders. As a government of the people, government must remain accountable to the people; and therefore, inform them of government's steps to use their money wisely. This dynamic opens the door for research into ways to promote accountability without increasing bureaucracy and competitiveness.
- As described in the research, a collaborative oversight group was recommended to oversee the allocation of the consolidated federal grants. Additional research is needed to explore the scope, composition, and political influences of this oversight body.
- One criticism of block grants is inadequate or inappropriate spending of allocated funds. Additional research may explore the best course of action for dealing with jurisdictions failing to allocate monies in a manner consistent with the homeland security mission.
- This research recommends FBI reform to address the nation's fragmented and broken intelligence community. Additional research may explore the creation of a Domestic Intelligence Agency and its impact on civil liberties.

Collectively, this thesis promotes the concept of decentralization for the homeland security operational environment to capitalize on the formation of networks that will evolve, ultimately adding value to the larger enterprise. This is similar to Brafman and Beckstrom's argument that decentralization makes the enterprise more resilient and less vulnerable to attacks (2006). However, this thesis proposes a hybrid approach, where a structured intelligence environment

facilitates the cyclical flow of timely and accurate intelligence throughout the decentralized environment. This allows the larger network to learn and return value to the various smaller networks that comprise the whole. Considering the research and the articulated recommendations, the future of homeland security may resemble Figure 1, a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas is “both a diagnostic tool and an action framework for building a compelling . . . strategy” (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, 32).

## Strategy Canvas: The Future




Figure 1. Strategy Canvas—The Future (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005)

#### **D. WHERE DO WE FIT?**

Homeland security is an interdependent environment, referred to as an ecosystem by Bellavita (2008, p. 1). Such interdependency causes one component to influence the whole; that is, what may seem logical for a single component potentially has consequences for the entire enterprise.

Jim Ryan and David Shu (2009) conducted research involving the influence of extreme events to the financial industry resulting from the interdependency of the myriad of institutions. Their research reflects that large or small, the influence of significant events was similar. Therefore, the goal was to “Prepare firms for extreme events or even help sidestep them . . . [as] extreme events always seem ‘impossible’ until they happen” (Ryan & Shu, 2009, pp. 36–37). Considering the homeland security enterprise is equally as complex as the financial industry, the interdependency of the enterprise causes it to be similarly influenced. Consider the September 11, 2001, attacks and the influence on an interdependent enterprise.

At the end of the first week of trading after the destruction of the Twin Towers, there was a 14 percent decline in the Dow, which at that time was the second worst in history; at the end of the next week, there was a \$15 billion federal bailout of the airline industry. There were fears about oil and gas supplies, which the president responded to with demands that the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge be opened for drilling, as a matter of national security; there was the requisite article about strapped couples learning to cook at home instead of indulging in restaurants; by the end of the year, there was the climactic bankruptcy of Enron, a company whose deals mystified even its dealmakers, earning it a place in the annals of economic arcana long before the advent of the subprime derivative. (Junod, 2009, p. 1)

Seeing that a single incident influences the whole, how do we make sense of our individual place in the larger complex enterprise? The answer seems to lie in Dr. Scott Alan Norton’s (active-duty Colonel in the U.S. Army Medical Corps) analysis of disease. He notes:



One cannot simply look at the patient's disease. One must also recognize the interaction between the patient and the surrounding community; the interrelationship between the disease and larger societal issues; and the transmission factors involved in a disease—"Why did this patient get that disease?" (Hilton, 2007, p. 99)

Therefore, when answering the question of where we fit in the homeland security enterprise, the answer must be—it depends. That is, it may depend on a comprehensive understanding of the definition of homeland security; it may depend on understanding of how federalism shapes our actions to complexity and uncertainty; it may depend on our ability to enhance collaborative capacity; and it may depend on a combination of all of these interconnected elements.

Understanding that any jurisdiction may take the lead in today's incident, but find itself a mere role player in tomorrow's, seems to suggest that perhaps, the wrong questions are being asked. In the context of Dr. Norton's question about why the patient got the disease, the better question for the homeland security enterprise may be, "Why is it that we find ourselves wondering where we fit in homeland security?" This study seems to point to a lack of leadership, where top-down coercive actions do not coincide with words and policy, thereby creating suspicion and distrust across the enterprise.

According to Ryan and Shu (2009, p. 41), "It is up to a few good leaders in each organization to challenge the status quo . . . if there is anything certain . . . it is its uncertainty." What is needed is "A new brand of collaborative and innovative leadership" (Elkington, 2008, p. 1). It is up to homeland security leaders to look beyond their individual entities in an effort to add value to the whole enterprise. Leaders at the various levels of government must become more transparent with one another and recognize that interconnectivity is a strength to build upon.

In closing, this study truly reflects that there is no clear cause and effect relationship that produces the specific answer to the research question. Instead, the answer lies in the ability influence the homeland security enterprise by adding

value at the most incremental level; that is, stakeholders must add value when and where possible. By adding individual value, the synergy of the combined efforts will move the homeland security enterprise in a positive direction.

The paths to the house I seek to make. But leave to those to come the house itself.

Walt Whitman (1819–1892)

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## APPENDIX A. AUSTRALIA—U.S. COMPARISON

Table 4. Australia—United States, A Comparison of Key Areas

Topic/Subject	Australia	United States	Similarities	Differences
General Area	7,686,850 sq km (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	9,826,630 sq km (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Australia is slightly smaller than the U.S.'s 48 contiguous states	Australia is an island with no border nation
Natural Hazards	Cyclones, droughts; and forest fires (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Tsunamis, volcanoes, hurricanes; tornadoes, mud slides, forest fires, flooding; and permafrost (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Forest fires	The U.S. is vulnerable to many more natural hazards
Population	21,007,310 and growing at a rate of 1.22% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	303,824,640 and growing at a rate of .88% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	The growth rate is somewhat similar, but considering the population differences, the of rate of change is relatively insignificant	The U.S. has a much larger population
Ethnicity	White 92%, Asian 7%, aboriginal and other 1% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	White 79.96%, Black 12.85%, Asian 4.43%, Amerindian and Alaska native 0.97%, native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander 0.18%, and 15.1% of the total U.S. population is Hispanic (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Both populations have a large concentration of whites	The U.S. has a more diverse population

<b>Topic/Subject</b>	<b>Australia</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Similarities</b>	<b>Differences</b>
Religion	Catholic 26.4%, Anglican 20.5%, other Christian 20.5%, Buddhist 1.9%, Muslim 1.5%, other 1.2%, unspecified 12.7%, none 15.3% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Protestant 51.3%, Roman Catholic 23.9%, Mormon 1.7%, other Christian 1.6%, Jewish 1.7%, Buddhist 0.7%, Muslim 0.6%, other or unspecified 2.5%, unaffiliated 12.1%, none 4% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Both countries have a large catholic representation	Australia has a higher Muslim representation. The U.S. is majority Protestants
Government	Constitutional monarchy. Federal parliamentary democracy (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008 & U.S. Department of State, 2009).	Constitution-based federal republic; strong democratic tradition (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Both are democracies	Australian is governed Parliament, while the U.S. is governed by a balance of power between the President and Congress
Administrative Divisions	6 states and 2 territories (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	50 states and 1 district (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Both have federal and state divisions	The U.S. has in excess of eight times the division and is highly decentralized.
Legal System	Based on English common law (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008). Very low threshold for wire intercepts and intelligence driven investigations (Hurley, 2009)	Federal court system based on English common law; each state has its own unique legal system. (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008) Judicial review is a major component of investigations and tactics.	Both are based on English Common law. Both have expanded their use of warrants and intercept capabilities (Grono, 2004)	In the U.S., each state has its own unique legal system. Australia enjoys greater latitude when conducting investigations, as they are not concerned with a sense of fairness since prosecution is not the goal of their investigation (Hurley, 2009).

<b>Topic/Subject</b>	<b>Australia</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>Similarities</b>	<b>Differences</b>
Transportation	461 airports, 38,550 km of railways, and 50 ports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	14, 947 airports, 226,612 km of railways, and 422 ports (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Both have a wide array of transportation modes	The U.S. has a much larger transportation infrastructure
General Transnational Concerns	Terrorism is the major concern. Additionally, Australia is engaged in ongoing maritime border disputes with Indonesia and some of its regional states. It has concerns regarding general border security, transnational criminality, economic pressures, and health issues (Hurley, 2009). Tasmania is one of the world's major suppliers of opiate products, and the nation is a major consumer of cocaine and amphetamines (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Terrorism is the major concern. In addition, the U.S. increased domestic security and has collaborated with Canada and Mexico. The country has ongoing conflicts and continues to be the world's largest consumer of cocaine (Central Intelligence Agency, 2008)	Terrorism is the primary concern for both countries. Also, both have maritime border disputes and both have an ongoing drug problem	Australia is a major exporter of opiate products and the scale of the issues are magnified in the United States due to its population size and diversity.

Topic/Subject	Australia	United States	Similarities	Differences
Security Environment	<p>Main threat is terrorism, both homegrown and al Qaeda. Radicalization is of great concern, as the population has become complacent since September 11, 2001 (Hurley, 2009). Australia has limited detention capabilities. In addition, intelligence and military operations are distinctly separated, as well as, intelligence and law enforcement operations. Lastly, Australia has experienced some exposure to terrorist activity. (Grono, 2004). Member of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) (U.S. Department of State, 2009).</p>	<p>Terrorism is identified as the main threat to security. U.S. enjoys extensive detention capabilities. Additionally, the line between military and intelligence operations is less clear. Intelligence and law enforcement functions are integrated, as the FBI is an example. Finally, the U.S. experienced catastrophic damage from a direct terrorist attack. (Grono, 2004) Member of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) (U.S. Department of State, 2009).</p>	<p>Terrorism is a real concern for both countries. Additionally, both have enhanced intelligence collection and dedicated additional resources to intelligence agencies (Grono, 2004). Both are allies and although defense obligations to New Zealand have been suspended, Australia and the U.S. remain committed to the 1951 ANZUS Treaty (U.S. Department of State, 2009).</p>	<p>The U.S. has integrated its intelligence with law enforcement and the military, where Australia emphasizes the importance of separating these functions.</p> <p>The U.S. suffered a devastating terrorist attack (Grono, 2004)</p>

## APPENDIX B. DATA COLLECTION TOOL

### **Scenario I:**

*Intelligence feeds indicate with high certainty that a small group acquired explosives and planned to detonate a device near a large metropolitan area in Virginia. Intelligence indicates the group will use a rental van to move the device into the center of the respective metropolitan area.*

*If you are a local representative, please assume that this event is in your actual jurisdiction.*

**Question:** What if anything is your agency doing in direct response to this intelligence feed?

**Question:** What if any notifications are you making in response to this intelligence?

**Question:** What is the role of you/your agency at this point?

**Questions:** What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be deployed?

**Question:** What if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other homeland security stakeholders? (Please be specific and explain why you make your assertion(s)).

*Undetected, the device detonates at metropolitan's center. Most buildings within 3,200 feet of the device are destroyed and/or severely damaged. Injuries and deaths are substantial.*

**Question:** What is your agency doing at this point?

**Question:** What notifications are you making at this point?

**Question:** What is the role of you/your agency at this point?

**Question:** What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be deployed?

**Question:** What level of government is in charge at the scene of this incident (local, state, federal, or regional government board)?



**Question:** Other than the actual event (explosion with deaths and injuries), what concerns do you have?

**Question:** With regards to my concerns noted in the last question, I'm most concerned with \_\_\_\_\_, because\_\_\_\_\_.

*For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following:*

I have complete confidence in my organization's ability to fulfill our role in the above scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I am concerned with the level of training of many of the responding agencies.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I am concerned with the level of competency of many of the responding agencies.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

Appropriate policies, strategies, and guidelines are in place for a scenario of this type.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

My organization is well prepared for this type of scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

My organization is well trained and equipped for this type of scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

All agencies will work well together with little conflict.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

Considering this scenario, all agencies/stakeholders understand their role and where they fit in the overall scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

### **Scenario II:**

*You receive a citizen report of an unusual situation. The citizen reports seeing a truck driving through the streets of a densely populated area while spraying something from a cylinder into the air. Local police respond and locate the abandoned truck, which appears to have completely disbursed the substance. Intelligence and initial investigation indicate the substance may be hazardous.*

**Question:** What if anything is your agency doing in direct response to this situation?

**Question:** What if any notifications are you making in response to this situation?

**Question:** What is the role of you/your agency at this point?

**Questions:** What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be deployed?

**Question:** What if any concerns do you have regarding the action of other homeland security stakeholders? (Please be specific and explain why you make your assertion(s)).

*Further, investigation reveals the substance is aerosolized anthrax and several first responders and citizens have been exposed.*

**Question:** What is your agency doing at this point?

**Question:** What notifications are you making at this point?

**Question:** What is the role of you/your agency at this point?

**Question:** What if any resources are to be activated and where are they to be deployed?

**Question:** What level of government is in charge at the scene of this incident (local, state, federal, or regional government board)?

**Question:** Other than the actual event (exposure and injuries), what concerns do you have?

**Question:** With regards to my concerns noted in the last question, I'm most concerned with \_\_\_\_\_, because \_\_\_\_\_.

*For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following:*

I have complete confidence in my organization's ability to fulfill our role in the above scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I am concerned with the level of training of many of the responding agencies.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I am concerned with the level of competency of many of the responding agencies.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

Appropriate policies, strategies, and guidelines are in place for a scenario of this type.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

My organization is well prepared for this type of scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

My organization is well trained and equipped for this type of scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

All agencies will work well together with little conflict.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

Considering this scenario, all agencies/stakeholders understand their role and where they fit in the overall scenario.

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

Please record any additional comments about either of these scenarios:

**General Questions** (*These questions are not related to the above scenarios*):

**Question:** With regards to homeland security in Virginia, what is working well?

**Question:** With regards to homeland security in Virginia, what is not working well?

**Question:** With regards to homeland security in Virginia, what changes do you recommend?

**Question:** If I could change one thing anywhere in homeland security, I would change \_\_\_\_\_.

**Question:** Is homeland security a local, state, federal, and/or regional responsibility? (Please explain why your position).

*For the following, select the number that best reflects your perspective and/or experience with regards to the above scenario for each of the following:*

I have complete confidence in local response, planning, and preparedness capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency).

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I have complete confidence in state response, planning, and preparedness capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency).

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I have complete confidence in federal response, planning, and preparedness capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency).

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

I have complete confidence in regional response, planning, and preparedness capabilities (personnel, training, equipment, and competency).

1	2	3	4	5
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Strongly Disagree	Neutral			Strongly Agree

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